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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Proliferation Issues**

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# PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-94-008

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1 April 1994

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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## NIGERIA

### Weapons Manifest of Nigerian Plane Reported

NC2103120594 Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek  
21 Mar 94 p 18

[Report by V. Vasou]

[Excerpts] The saga of the Nigerian Boeing, stranded at Larnaca Airport for six days loaded with 23 tons of arms, has ended well. The arms were transferred from the Boeing to a British plane yesterday. Both planes then left Larnaca Airport.

The Nigerian plane [as published] arrived in Larnaca from Amman yesterday at 1600 and the transfer of arms began around an hour later. The transfer was carried out by special forklifts sent from Israel and by workers of the company representing the Nigerian plane in Cyprus.

Larnaca Airport Director Andreas Papathomas told I SIMERINI that the airport's management made forklifts and carriages available to carry 10 big cases of arms. All the cases were covered with black nylon.

During the transfer, which took three hours, police took very strict security measures. Civil Aviation Department Director Mikhail Irodhotou was at the airport. The Nigerian plane was later given permission to depart on three engines for Tel Aviv, where it will be repaired. [passage omitted on background information]

[Just below the report, I SIMERINI publishes a photocopy of what is described as a "secret report" listing the cargo of the plane. The document, an apparent shipping manifest, includes the following information in English: Vessel: 707-351 CH Port of Loading: TEL AVIV Port of Discharge: ENTEBBE AMMUNITION AS FOLLOWS: UN 0180 CLASS 1.1F, Net weight (kg) 30, Gross weight (kg) 280 UN 0049 CLASS 1.1G, Net weight (kg) 7, Gross weight (kg) 50 UN 0417 CLASS 1.3C, Net weight (kg) 3,720, Gross weight (kg) 21,370 UN 0006 CLASS 1.1E, Net weight (kg) 40, Gross weight (kg) 282.

[An annotation next to the title of the manifest reads:] "PSG/CGO"

[An arrow after the second entry, 1.1G, points to the following handwritten note:] "Cartridges Flash Forbidden."

[A handwritten note after the third entry, 1.3C, reads:] "Cartridges for weapons/inert projectile (cartridges/small arms)."

[An arrow after the fourth entry, 1.1E, points to the following handwritten note:] "Cartridges for weapons with bursting charge FORBIDDEN."

[A handwritten note below the above typed information reads:] "According to IATA Dangerous Goods

Regulations above UN numbers reads as follows: UN 0180 ROCKETS with Bursting charge is FORBIDDEN for air carriage (both Passenger and Cargo Aircraft.) See page 186 IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations."

[The name and stamp of the shipping company are located on the bottom left of the form and read as follows:] TAAS-ISRAEL INDUSTRIES Ltd DORON KASHTA [several unidentified letters] SHIPPING MNG. RAMAI-HASHARON 47100 Date: 13.3.94.

## SOUTH AFRICA

### Nuclear Scientists Threaten To Reveal Secret Arms Programs

#### 'Blackmail' Admitted

MB2703102194 Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES  
in English 27 Mar 94 pp 1-2

[Text] Disgruntled South African nuclear and rocket scientists are threatening to expose closely guarded secrets about the country's arms programme unless they are paid R[and]4.5-million in retrenchment benefits.

A spokesman claiming to represent 16 scientists admitted this week the threat amounted to blackmail.

"We want a settlement but negotiation has failed and we don't want to have to take this to the industrial court. Our disclosures will prove embarrassing for Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa], Denel (an off-shoot of Armscor) and the Nationalist government," he warned.

The group has unreleased details about South Africa's past co-operation with Israel on missile technology. Some of this challenges claims by President F.W. de Klerk last year that he had come clean on the country's nuclear story.

The 16 scientists are preparing an appeal to the industrial court in which they are demanding two years' salaries and benefits from Denel.

They were retrenched with two months' notice from Advena, a Denel subsidiary, on April 15 last year. They claim they were promised another two year's work.

The spokesman, who asked not to be named at present, said their firsthand information would identify sources of specialised equipment for nuclear bombs in the United Kingdom, France and Germany.

He also claimed Israel supplied rock technology and details of a process which transformed a satellite launcher into a nuclear ballistic missile.

And in a move which could realise the arms industry's greatest fear—nuclear weapons scientists selling secrets to rogue nations or terrorists—the spokesman said the group would construct bombs for anyone, if their salaries were guaranteed.

When Mr. de Klerk announced the destruction of South Africa's nuclear capability a year ago, he was adamant that no foreign help was used in the weapons' programme. But he made no mention of missile delivery capability.

Now the spokesman for the maverick scientists claims South Africa's defunct space programme was originally intended to use a clone of the Israeli Jericho II two-stage solid fuel missile to deliver nuclear weapons.

Two all-terrain mobile launchers were built and tested at Armscor's proving group at Advena in 1988 and 1989. They were never used. The missile, last code-named RSA3, was only fired in static tests.

The spokesman said more than 200 South Africans visited Israel covertly and worked on the missile programme between 1989 and 1992.

In a multi-million rand deal, Israel had sold South Africa a system of explosives that could stop the missile in mid-flight at a predetermined point, allowing it to fall on to a target city with an accuracy of less than one kilometre.

In October 1989, publicly expressed concerns by U.S. officials, including President George Bush, about Israeli and South African collaboration on a medium-range nuclear missile were denied by both countries.

The spokesman said that after the initial 18-kiloton (18,000 tons of TNT) "dirty" bombs were completed, development of more powerful nuclear weapons continued in secret at SADF (South African Defense Force) insistence until late 1989 when Mr. de Klerk ordered that the programme be stopped.

These more powerful nuclear weapons included thermo-nuclear hydrogen bombs.

"What is the deterrent value of a 20-kiloton bomb when your enemy is threatening you with a 100-kiloton bomb?" the scientist asked.

The spokesman, who identified himself as a supporter of the right wing, said: "Some of us and many in the SADF [South African Defense Force] strongly believed that a couple of bombs should have been held back and kept in white hands."

The spokesman said: "I am not ashamed of what we did, but I cannot get a job. We are treated like outcasts. We are South Africa's nuclear casualties."

He had applied for 50 jobs and five of the rest of the group were unemployed.

The international implications of the scientists' threats are severe. Revealing suppliers would tarnish South Africa's credibility in the secrecy-obsessed international arms market and cause controversy in the countries involved.

The involvement of South African expertise in outlaw weapons programme would raise great international concern and possible conflict with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has overseen South Africa's nuclear rehabilitation.

A Denel spokesman confirmed yesterday that 16 employees were contesting termination of their service. Negotiations had failed because of their "unfounded and unreasonable claims and expectations".

Intimidation through the media left Denel disillusioned at the conduct of people "with high technology standing for whom Denel has only the highest regard and sympathy," the spokesman said.

#### Armscor Threatens Prosecution

MB2703202694 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
2010 GMT 27 March 94

[Text] Johannesburg March 27 SAPA—Any "disgruntled nuclear and rocket scientist," who disclosed information about South Africa's nuclear weapons program, would be liable to charges under legislation preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] said in a statement on Sunday.

Armscor was responding to a Sunday newspaper report which said nuclear scientists in a salary dispute with Armscor had threatened to reveal as yet undisclosed information about South Africa's past cooperation with Israel.

The report said the 16 scientists charged that they had been promised two years' employment with local armament manufacturer Denel, but were retrenched with only two months' notice.

Reacting to these allegations, Armscor said the 16 former employees only had limited know-how of nuclear devices. Armscor reaffirmed there was no international cooperation on the development and manufacture of South Africa's nuclear devices.

The statement said Armscor also endorsed the principles of the international non-proliferations bodies on not disclosing information which could lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.



### Supreme Court Issues 'Gagging Order'

MB3003194094 Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY*  
in English 30 Mar 94 p 1-2

[Report by Stephanie Bothma]

[Text] Pretoria—The Transvaal Supreme Court has placed a gagging order on former Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] nuclear and rocket scientists, preventing them disclosing details about the supply, export, import, manufacture or research of any armaments.

Armscor brought an urgent application against 16 former employees—who were among 60 people retrenched last February when Armscor subsidiary Denel rationalised its Advena division.

The arms manufacturer argued in court that publication of arms secrets could seriously damage SA's newly acquired standing in the international defence industry.

The move followed a report that the scientists had threatened to disclose nuclear secrets unless they were paid R4.5m [million rands] in compensation by their former employer. The scientists admitted that their demands amounted to blackmail.

Judge TT Spoelstra prohibited the scientists from disclosing information to the media or unauthorised people about the obtaining, supplying, marketing, importing, exporting, development, manufacture, maintenance or repair of armaments by Armscor or its subsidiaries.

In an affidavit supporting the application, Armscor guided missile systems chief Gideon Smith said all the scientists had signed on oath of secrecy.

Armscor's mission to secure SA's armament needs as effectively and economically as possible meant that technology, knowledge, material and equipment had to be obtained from abroad. All dealings with overseas countries or companies were extremely sensitive and secrecy received absolute priority, Smith said.

Last November SA had entered into an agreement with the U.S. on the restriction of missile-related export and import, including guarantees that secret information would not be disclosed. Adherence to this agreement would result in the U.S. recommending SA's admittance as a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR].

"To be accepted as a member of the MTCR would be beneficial to Armscor and SA. Armscor would have access to technology and foreign markets currently not available to it. Should sensitive information be made available, SA's chances of being admitted would be very poor."

Smith said that on November 11, four scientists, Christiaan du Plooy, Eldrid Fick, Klaus Muller and

Jan Frederik Combrink, had informed Denel about a potential labour dispute. They had demanded re-employment or further compensation, a demand rejected by Denel a month later.

Since then, nothing had been heard from the scientists until last Sunday, when a newspaper article appeared headlined "Nuclear Scientists Threaten To Tell All."

Smith said the report had sparked immediate inquiries from Switzerland and several other countries, which had been upset and worried by the media reports.

It had been reported that the scientists were prepared to accept employment from anyone who could guarantee their salaries. If they received employment as a result of the publicity, sensitive information could be passed on their new employers and Armscor would lose control over such information, Smith said.

Armscor's attorney said only six of the 16 scientists cited in the court action had been aware of the newspaper report, while the others had indicated that they were prepared to honour their oath of secrecy.

The six who had been aware of the report were Du Plooy, Combrink, Ester Maria Swart, Cornelius Appelgryn, Maarten Pretorius and Jurie Heydenrich.

The scientists had 14 days to oppose the application and have the order amended or set aside, the judge ordered.

### Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement Program Described

94AF0131 Johannesburg *THE SUNDAY TIMES*  
in English 20 Feb 94 p 6

[Text] Armscor this week revealed exactly how it is beating its swords into ploughshares.

At a military research seminar in Braamfontein, Armscor senior manager Dr. Andre Buys described how the only country in the world to ever dismantle a nuclear weapons capability had gone about it.

South Africa has 400kg of highly enriched uranium in storage 15km from Pretoria, supposedly safe against terrorists—unless they have scientists on their side, said Mr. David Albright, president of the US-based Institute for Science and International Security.

South Africa also had a controversial batch of tritium, which dramatically increases the power of nuclear weapons, imported from Israel in exchange for uranium.

As part of the scheme, the tritium was sold for use in fluorescent signs such as those on cinema exits.

South Africa—the founder member of "the ex-nuclear club"—realized it had to commercialize its technology if it was to succeed in dismantling its nuclear weapons capability, said Dr. Buys.

Scores of Armscor ideas were whittled down to 17 business units with processes stemming from the uranium enrichment programme.

Centrifuges designed to enrich uranium were adapted to reduce emissions from industrial stacks, to filter air for helicopter turbines and to improve ventilation.

Staff members at Armscor subsidiaries involved in the construction of nuclear devices also came up with 200 commercial ideas that were hacked down to six projects.

These were:

- Explosive cladding. Metals aluminium that cannot be welded conventionally are joined by explosives;
- Creating rare-earth magnets;
- Linking tungsten to copper or silver for use in electrical switchgear;
- Hot isostatic pressing which allowed components to be made from metallic powders;
- Pyrotechnic products which include special focused explosives to break up big boulders; and,
- A medical ventilator.

However, Dr. Buys said it was not known if the technology conversion would be successful in the long term.

"Since no one else has dismantled a nuclear weapons program, there is nowhere to look for advice."

The 400kg of highly enriched uranium outside Pretoria cannot immediately be reconstituted into weapon form.

And, with a glut of nuclear material on world markets, it is only worth R15-million.

But if, as the ANC wishes, it is used to make medical isotopes, the value will increase to R500-million.

However, Western nations oppose this option because they fear the "black bomb"—industry terminology for a black nation with nuclear-weapons capability.

Mr. Albright said: "America doesn't want highly enriched uranium to remain in South Africa."

At the ANC's military research group meeting in Johannesburg this week, he said the West wanted the possibility of bomb-making removed from South African soil.

But Mr. Albright said: "The US government won't give up on highly enriched uranium. They don't want to hurt South Africa economically—they just don't want it to have this power."

On the other side, the ANC was "upset by the lack of trust, the idea that it wants to create a black bomb."

"If highly enriched uranium wasn't present in South Africa, it would take years before it could get a nuclear weapon here," said Mr. Albright.

"But as it is, the project could be reconstituted in secret and it would take only a few months."

Mr. Dion Smith of Armscor confirmed that a maximum of 1,000 South Africans had known about the nuclear military program—so reconstitution in secret was not impossible.

The closest South Africa came to using one was in 1987.

Test-bomb shafts were dug in the Kalahari desert and later closed in the 70's.

But they were reopened in 1987, said the ANC's Roger Jardine, because "the Cubans were overrunning the SADF in Angola."

Dr. Buys said: "The shafts were reopened in relation to events in Angola. The war was reaching a semi-conventional state and it was backed by the Soviet Union."

The thinking was that if South Africa detonated a nuclear bomb in a shaft, the Americans would pick it up on satellite or seismic equipment and would be forced to help—or risk SA using remaining "credible devices."

And so the watchers and the watched, former adversaries, continue to debate the chronology and detail of what really happened, with Armscor asking for a copy of a Soviet report it says "cannot exist."

**Delegate To Geneva Talks Calls For Nuclear Weapons Treaty**

*OW2503133494 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service  
in Chinese 1010 GMT 25 Mar 94*

[Text] Geneva, 24 Mar (XINHUA)—On the floor of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva today, Hou Zhitong, Lead of the Chinese delegation, reiterated the Chinese Government's stand and views on nuclear disarmament, nuclear test ban, and other issues.

Hou Zhitong pointed out: China has never shirked its responsibility for promoting nuclear disarmament. China has always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Since the first day when it came into possession of nuclear weapons, the Chinese Government has solemnly declared to the world its commitment of not being the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances. It has also undertaken not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-free zones.

He said: In order to promote the process of nuclear disarmament and realize the goal of preventing nuclear war, the Chinese Government has recently taken further initiatives. On December 23 last year, the Chinese Government formally proposed to the United States, the Russian Federation, and other nuclear weapon states that negotiations be started among the five nuclear weapon states to conclude a "Treaty on the Non-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons." In early March this year, China again urged the four other nuclear states to give a positive response to China's initiative, and asked them to send delegations for talks in Beijing. It is the view of the Chinese Government that under the present international situation, the condition is ripe for the five nuclear weapon states to negotiate and conclude such an international treaty. The Chinese Government believes the conclusion of this treaty will significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war and provide security to the five nuclear weapon states, especially the small and medium-sized ones among them. It will

also improve mutual trust and contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation. Such a treaty will also play an important role in realizing a comprehensive nuclear test ban and promoting nuclear disarmament.

Hou Zhitong expressed the hope that countries concerned will respond positively to China's initiative and start negotiations with a view to concluding a "Treaty on the Non-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons" as soon as possible. After that, they should go one step further by negotiating and concluding an international treaty on not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, so as to make a decisive contribution to freeing mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

On the issue of a nuclear test moratorium, Hou Zhitong said: China has always exercised utmost restraint on nuclear testing and the number of the nuclear tests it has conducted is extremely limited. China has the lowest number of nuclear tests among all nuclear powers. China believes that an early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty [CTBT] will contribute to the realization of the objective of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In view of the above-mentioned considerations, the Chinese Government issued a statement on 5 October last year in support of an early conclusion of a CTBT, saying it will join other countries in the negotiations in an effort to conclude such a treaty no later than 1996.

Hou Zhitong pointed out: It is our opinion that an appropriate solution of the issue of security guarantees to the signatory states ought to be one of the tasks in the CTBT negotiation. The treaty should contain provisions for the signatory states with nuclear weapons to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against signatory states which do not possess nuclear weapons. At the same time, it should also provide for the signatory states with nuclear weapons to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. With all nuclear weapon states undertaking the above-mentioned obligations, it will add to the substance of the CTBT, further the treaty's universality, and constitute a major contribution to international peace and security.



## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

**ROK Government Forced Into 'Hard-Line' Position on DPRK Issue***SK2203075294 Seoul YONHAP in English 0711 GMT 22 Mar 94*

[Text] Seoul, March 22 (YONHAP)—The Seoul government grabbed "the stick" and considered using it Tuesday as the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] sent the North Korean nuclear issue back to the United Nations Security Council.

The government's North Korea policy was finally pushed into a hard-line corner by the aggressive and crude remarks made by the chief North Korean delegate to an inter-Korean working-level contact last Saturday, when he threatened war against the South.

Realizing the futility of efforts to persuade Pyongyang to accept full IAEA inspections and help resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue, officials at Chongwadae [presidential office] and national security-related ministries huddled to discuss countermeasures against further North Korean provocation.

President Kim Yong-sam said Tuesday his government has asked the United States to deploy Patriot anti-missile missiles across the country as soon as possible.

South Korea and the United States have also agreed in principle to resume their joint military exercise "Team Spirit" this year. President Kim said a final decision on the war games will be made after he visits Japan and China.

Kim disclosed these plans at a meeting of senior Democratic Liberal Party officials including Chairman Kim Chong-pil and four party postholders.

Almost at the same time, Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu and Defense Minister Yi Pyong-tae met with U.S. ambassador to Seoul James Laney and the commander of U.S. forces in Korea, Gen. Gary Luck, to discuss the deployment of Patriot missiles here and the Team Spirit exercise.

Senior Presidential Secretary for Foreign and National Security Affairs Chong Chong-uk noted, "There has been nearly no change in North Korea's attitude since it announced its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty last March.

"North Korea obviously wants to pursue its policy of improving relations with the United States while delaying inter-Korean dialogue with the eventual aim of eliminating Seoul's links with the United States," Chong said.

North Korea's use of "such a nuclear card," however, will no longer be effective, Chong declared.

At the hour-long breakfast meeting with ruling party leaders, President Kim expressed confidence that the South would repel any kind of provocation from North Korea.

After recalling all instances in which Pyongyang unilaterally frustrated Seoul's sincere attempts at dialogue and reconciliation, Kim said, "I did not expect the North to bring up talk of war last Saturday."

The matter was especially appalling because the North Korean chief delegate did not speak spontaneously but was reading a statement prepared earlier in Pyongyang, Kim said.

"Since we do not want the North isolated from the world community, we will leave the door open for dialogue," Kim said.

"But war should never break out on the Korean peninsula again under any circumstances. Preventing war is possible only when we are strong," Kim said, explaining his reason for ordering the deployment of Patriot missiles and considering resumption of Team Spirit this year.

The main opposition Democratic Party [DP], meanwhile, counselled the government Tuesday to refrain from "physical sanctions" against North Korea in favor of dialogue.

"If the government has determined that there is no immediate danger of war, it should be cautious in deciding on the deployment of the Patriot missiles and resumption of Team Spirit," said the party following a meeting of its policy-making Supreme Council.

"No one should be allowed to heighten tension on the Korean peninsula," the party said in a statement. "Resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue has to be made through a package deal."

The proposed exchange of special envoys between Seoul and Pyongyang will also have to be undertaken not as a precondition to resolve the issue but at the same time, the party said.

The DP then urged North Korea to accept IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities to guarantee transparency of nuclear safeguards and apologize for the chief delegate's statement that "Seoul will turn into a sea of fire if war breaks out."

In addition, the opposition party pointed out that the Seoul government should have a consistent North Korea policy.

Kim Tae-chung, former chairman of the Democratic Party, said he "could not help being aghast at the sea-of-fire statement by the North Korean delegate," according to his spokesman, Chong Tong-chae.

Kim Tae-chung was extremely shocked after reading the remark, since the North Korean regime has been saying it was for "the people of Korea" whenever there was a chance.

Kim, however, advised South Korea to avoid being taken in by such an irrational provocation, Chong said.

#### **Paper Details 5-Stage ROK Plan To Combat DPRK Attack**

SK2403122694 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean  
24 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by reporter Kim Chun-pom: "Scenario for the Five-Stage Punishment for North Korea's Provocation"]

[Text] In answering a question at the National Assembly National Defense Committee on 23 March, ROK Defense Minister Yi Pyong-tae said: "The ROK Government has mapped out a strategic concept in which if North Korea perpetrates a provocation in the five northwestern islands or specific areas [tukchong chiyok], the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces or the ROK Armed Forces alone will offer powerful punitive retaliation [kangnyokian ungjingbobok] and link this to an opportunity to wage a war to achieve reunification [tongiljonyok suhaengui kihoero yongyesikinda] depending on the state of the provocation."

Minister Yi made these remarks to stress that the ROK and the United States are all prepared for any emergency and are confident that they can meet any provocation of the North and to give a powerful warning to North Korea.

This is the first declaration that even though the government adheres to the principle of peaceful reunification, it has a plan not only to defend ourselves but to pursue even reunification with armed forces [mury-oktongilggaji mirobuchil] depending on the state of the provocation.

This strategic concept stated by Minister Yi is based on a strategy of punitive retaliation contained in the ROK-U.S. Combined Operations Plan (OP 5027). That is, this is a five-stage strategic concept in which if North Korea launches a preemptive attack, the government will not merely deter the enemy but conquer Pyongyang, isolate the North Korean regime, and enter into the stage of North-South reunification.

North Korea has deployed 8,400 long-range cannon and 2,400 multi-warheaded missiles within 100 km of the DMZ at present.

It reportedly has developed or is developing "Taepodong-1 and -2" missiles, in addition to the Nodong-1 and -2 and the Scud ground-to-ground missiles.

In particular, it has hidden in underground tunnels aircraft for transporting commando units to infiltrate

into the rear area when it launches a southward invasion and has beefed up the anti-air batteries in Yongbyon, where there are nuclear reactors, from five to 47.

In preparation against this, the United States has recently deployed five of the latest radar tracking devices and put areas north of the DMZ under comprehensive 24-hour surveillance and even mapped out a plan to attack those batteries in an emergency.

The five-stage ROK-U.S. combined operations plan goes like this: In the prewar stage (first stage), if the ROK and the United States detect dangerous signs from North Korea, they will immediately call in the rapid deterrent forces (FDO).

At that time, "Defcon (Defense condition) 3" will be issued, and the Armed Forces will assume a combat ready posture [jontu chunbi taese].

This is because Seoul is a mere 40 km away from the DMZ and we have a mere 24- to 76-hour warning time for a North Korean attack.

Then, North Korea will bomb frontline units in a concentrated manner and send commando units to harass the rear of Seoul. As a result, major roads will be crowded with refugees, who will serve as a decisive obstacle to the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces' northward movements.

This is a second-stage situation. At that time, North Korea will infiltrate ground forces deployed along the DMZ into the South and attack Seoul in a concentrated manner by using Scud and Nodong-1 and -2 missiles.

In response, the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces will attack the central area of North Korea, advancing infantry units, and fighter planes by using their superior air fire power and Mistral, Hawk, and Nike missiles and intercept incoming missiles by using Patriot missiles.

This means that the defensive strategic concept which had been effective up until the mid-seventies and in which the ROK would launch a counterattack after abandoning Seoul has been replaced by a new concept in which the ROK would "repel North Korea north of Seoul."

At around this time, the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Carl Vinson of the 7th U.S. Fleet will be deployed to the East Sea [Sea of Japan] and strike the enemy's rear area in a concentrated manner.

At that time, AWACS early-warning planes and antisubmarine patrol planes (P-3C) will fly over the skies over the Korean peninsula, conduct aerial surveillance not only over North Korea, but also over areas of Russia and China, detect infiltrating aircraft and submarines in advance, and instruct the ground on shooting them down.

In the third stage, the armed forces will annihilate the major combat forces of North Korea, break through the DMZ, conduct large-scale landing operations, and advance northward.

At that time, the ROK and the United States will expand the frontline toward the Chongchon River, north of Pyongyang.

However, in this strategic concept, the ROK and the United States left the issue of whether they will advance toward the Yalu River at this stage for further deliberations depending on the situation.

No decision has been made on whether the 400,000 U.S. troops which will be reinforced with troops from the U.S. mainland will participate in the northward advance. The next stage is one of isolation. The forces will completely isolate Pyongyang from the rest of North Korea and establish a military rule, which includes civilian controls [chumintongjedung kunsatongchiril silsihanda].

The final, fifth stage will be a postwar phase. At this stage, the ROK will take the initiative to achieve reunification on the Korean peninsula.

#### **ROK Dailies Assess North Korean Nuclear Issue**

SK1903084394

[Editorial Report] Local vernacular dailies on 19 March carry editorials commenting on how the ROK Government should deal with North Korea regarding the nuclear issue in the wake of the announcement by the International Atomic Energy Agency that its inspection team was unable to satisfactorily inspect the North Korean nuclear facilities between 3 and 14 March because of North Korea's uncooperative attitude. The editorials note the little progress made in the inter-Korean working delegates' contact for the exchange of special envoys, and the possible cancellation of the third round of U.S.-North Korean high-level talks.

The moderate TONG-A ILBO carries on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "The Policy Toward the North Should Be Reviewed." The editorial begins, "It is undeniable that there have been two positions, dovish and hawkish, over the ways to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. This was the case in the ROK as well as in the United States. Both the ROK and the U.S. Governments have so far maintained the dovish position exploring a solution through dialogue and diplomatic efforts. We admit that this dovish line has attained a degree of success." The editorial then notes, "However, the doves overlooked an important fact. It resulted from their distorted view that dealing with the issue in a hawkish manner was like not hesitating to wage a war. They should have admitted earlier that the hawkish position is aimed at the same objective, namely, a peaceful settlement. To preserve peace, we must make clear our firm position of resolutely dealing

with any threat of war. This is all the more so especially when we deal with North Korea." The editorial notes, "The ROK even took a negative position as to the plan to deploy Patriot missiles in the ROK on the grounds that it could hurt the dialogue atmosphere, thus suffering an estrangement in ROK-U.S. relations. Now it is time to make a change," and concludes, "It seems that we have no more carrot to give. It is up to North Korea to make a choice."

The moderate HANGUK ILBO carries on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "It Is Time To Reestablish Policy Toward the North." The editorial notes, "The time has reached a point where we can no longer tolerate the North Korean attitude of breaking promises, its delaying and avoiding tactics. We should now reconfirm clear principles and reestablish our position. In case North Korea rejects full nuclear inspection and the envoy exchange, we should make clear our position as to the consideration of resumption of the Team Spirit joint military exercise and the deployment of Patriot missiles, and sanctions on North Korea. We should also consider the suspension of inter-Korean economic cooperation, including the ongoing unofficial inter-Korean trade."

The left-leaning HANGYORE SINMUN carries on page 3 a 900-word editorial entitled "The Nuclear Inspection of North Korean Facilities and the Government's Measures." The editorial says, "The government should maintain a firm policy and continue to persuade North Korea since the situation is expected to worsen if the North Korean nuclear issue is referred to the UN Security Council. North Korea, on its part, should now review its strategy of negotiation with the United States and South Korea. Irrespective of North Korea's basic strategy, the North Korean attitude is narrowing the gap for negotiation of the dialogue advocates in South Korea and the United States and is encouraging the voice of those who oppose dialogue."

#### **JAPAN**

##### **Takemura Urges DPRK To 'Remove Suspicions' on Nuclear Arms**

OW2403041494 Tokyo KYODO in English 0406 GMT 24 Mar 94

[Text] Tokyo, March 24 KYODO—Japan still hopes North Korea will opt to remove suspicions that the communist country is secretly developing nuclear weapons, Chief Cabinet Secretary Masayoshi Takemura said Thursday [24 March].

"We will continue to expect North Korea to take desirable steps in accordance with international opinion," the top government spokesman told a news conference.

Takemura also said Japan will keep in close touch with the United States and South Korea to exchange views



on ways of tackling the growing threats arising from North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons development program.

While acknowledging that Tokyo's diplomatic channels to Pyongyang remain closed, Takemura noted that its Foreign Ministry is striving to find ways to persuade North Korea indirectly to remove the suspicions concerning its nuclear development program.

Earlier this week, the International Atomic Energy Agency adopted a resolution referring the issue of North Korea's refusal to accept full inspections to the UN Security Council, which may subsequently consider economic sanctions against Pyongyang.

North Korea slammed Japan on Wednesday for considering backing such sanctions, saying, "if seditious forces dare to put unreasonable pressure upon us in the form of 'sanctions,' we would regard it as something equivalent to 'a declaration of war'."

Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa will confer with South Korean President Kim Yong-sam, who arrived in Tokyo on Thursday for a three-day stay, on possible ways to encourage North Korea to allay concerns that it is developing a nuclear weapon capability.

#### **Radioactivity-Monitoring Ship Heads for Sea of Japan**

OW2203032694 Tokyo KYODO in English 0311 GMT  
22 Mar 94

[Text] Niigata, March 22 KYODO—A Russian-registered oceanographic survey ship left here Tuesday [22 March] on a mission to monitor the effects on the Sea of Japan of radioactive waste dumping by a vessel of the Russian Pacific Fleet last year, Japanese Government officials said.

The dispatch of the 4,162-ton Okean by Japan, Russia and South Korea was called for by a conference of scientists held in the Russian far east city of Vladivostok last month.

The Okean carries nine Japanese Government officials and 27 scientists from South Korea, Russia and the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency.

The voyage is the first joint research effort by the three countries to study whether the sea is contaminated by radioactivity.

Seawater and seabed sediment samples will be collected by the Okean at seven points and measured for radioactivity, the officials said.

The Russian Navy on October 16 and 17 last year dumped 900 tons of liquid nuclear waste in the Sea of Japan. A planned second dumping was canceled following protests from Japan and South Korea.

## **NORTH KOREA**

### **Ministry Claims Pyongyang 'Fulfilled Obligations' on Inspections**

SK2103043694 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0419 GMT  
21 Mar 94

["Statement of DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on U.S. Perfidy"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, March 21 (KCNA)—A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a statement today clarifying the position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea toward the United States' perfidious act of reversing the agreed conclusions reached at the DPRK-U.S. contact in New York.

The statement reads:

The United States has committed a perfidious act by totally reversing the agreed conclusions reached at the DPRK-U.S. contact on February 25 in New York.

As is known, the DPRK and the United States at the New York contact on February 25 agreed upon four immediate steps of simultaneous action for a package solution to the nuclear issue—suspension of the Team Spirit 94 joint military maneuvers, resumption of the working-level contact for the exchange of presidential envoys between the North and South, acceptance of an inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] for maintaining the continuity of safeguards holding of the third round of the DPRK-USA talks in Geneva on March 21.

The agreement on these steps of simultaneous actions marked an important occasion in bringing back to its track the detracted process of a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue.

Out of our sincere desire to achieve a negotiated solution to the nuclear issue at any cost, we have honestly fulfilled our obligations pursuant to the agreed conclusions.

We accepted the IAEA inspectors' group at the designated date and sincerely provided them with all conditions so that they could conduct inspection activities of enough scope for maintaining the continuity of safeguards at the seven declared facilities.

Even when the IAEA side rudely requested sampling and measurement that go far beyond the agreed scope for the continuity of safeguards, we met its demand as much as possible, showing our utmost good will.

We have held several rounds of working-level contact with the South side and made every effort possible for an early exchange of special envoys between the North and South, proposing detailed ways and reasonable measures. The U.S. side, however, has fulfilled none of its obligations, making empty talk since the publication of the New York agreement of February 25.

Although the United States announced suspension of the Team Spirit 94 joint military exercises and the date of the opening of the third round of DPRK-U.S. talks, it unreasonably made them conditional, saying that it would keep that promise only after the inspection by the IAEA had been made satisfactorily and the special envoys exchanged between the North and South.

This was a violation of the New York agreement based on the principle of simultaneous action.

The United States has gone so far as to break the New York agreement on the steps of simultaneous action, alleging that the IAEA's inspection of the DPRK's nuclear facilities was not satisfactory and the exchange of presidential envoys between the North and South has not been realised.

The United States threatens that if the DPRK does not allow inspection by the IAEA and does not realise the exchange of special envoys between the North and South, it will resume the Team Spirit joint military exercises in 1994, will not have the third round of DPRK-U.S. talks and will transfer the problem of the DPRK to the United Nations Security Council.

In the meantime, the secretariat of the IAEA is going to convene a meeting of the Board of Governors to adopt a "resolution" against the DPRK.

Thus, the United States has openly reversed the New York agreement and totally destroyed the foundation for the third round of talks, darkening the prospect of the settlement of the nuclear issue, at this crucial moment when its settlement is in sight. This is motivated by its consistent hostile policy toward the DPRK.

It is obvious that the United States set unreasonable preconditions which are not specified in the New York agreement because they sought from the beginning the political purpose of stifling the DPRK, not a solution to the nuclear issue through DPRK-U.S. talks.

The United States is distorting the fact, claiming that their unreasonable preconditions were included in the agreement with the DPRK. But they had been refuted by the DPRK's reasonable argument at the time of the discussion of the New York agreement.

Even after the publication of the agreed conclusions, they are insisting on the unilateral preconditions rejected by the DPRK. This cannot be construed otherwise than a deliberate scheme to break the New York agreement and create a phase of confrontation.

In actuality, the United States is playing first fiddle in an international campaign for putting pressure on the DPRK, openly revealing its intention to stage the team spirit 94 joint military maneuvers and let the U.N. Security Council take "sanctions" against the DPRK on the pretext of the problems in the IAEA's inspection and the exchange of special envoys between the North and South.

All the facts clearly prove that the United States has neither the intention to continue talks nor the will to solve the nuclear issue but only schemes to isolate and stifle the DPRK with the nuclear issue and the DPRK-U.S. talks as an expedient.

This perfidious act of the United States is creating a grave situation on the Korean peninsula, which may bring the Korean nation back to the phase of confrontation and war.

Now that the United States has broken the New York agreement and brought the DPRK-U.S. talks to a rupture, leading the situation to the extreme pitch of strain, we can no longer unilaterally fulfil our obligations concerning the steps of simultaneous action.

Therefore, we have decided not to send our delegation to the third round of DPRK-U.S. talks.

Since the United States and the IAEA are deliberately distorting the results of the recent inspection for the continuity of safeguards and using it as a pretext for putting pressure on the DPRK, we will no longer deem it our obligation to ensure the continuity of safeguards.

This measure of ours accords with the principle of the New York agreement of February 25, which stipulates that the fulfilment of each simultaneous action agreed upon is necessary for the implementation of all the agreed conclusions.

Unshakable and consistent is our position that we are not bound by our promise with the United States once the latter breaks its promise with us.

The DPRK Government in its statement dated March 12 last year said that our declared withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was caused mainly by the U.S. nuclear threat to the DPRK, including the Team Spirit joint military exercises, and its policy of stifling the DPRK and the partiality of the IAEA.

In the DPRK-U.S. joint statement of June 11, 1993 in New York, we made it clear that we would unilaterally and temporarily suspend the effectuation of our withdrawal from the NPT, on condition that the DPRK-U.S. talks for a solution to the nuclear issue continued.

If the United States avoids the DPRK-U.S. talks and increases nuclear threat to the DPRK, resuming the team spirit joint military exercises in 1994, and if the IAEA widens its partiality and resorts to strong-arm politics and pressure, distorting the results of the recent inspection of the DPRK nuclear facilities, we have no alternative but to carry into practice the measures declared in the DPRK Government's statement of March 12 last year in order to defend the sovereignty of the nation and the security of the state.

Even if the settlement of the nuclear issue is delayed because of the failure of the DPRK-U.S. talks, we are not in a hurry at all.

The United States must ponder over the prevailing situation, looking straight at its seriousness.

#### **UN Official Reportedly Willing To Allow More Inspections**

SK2403055194 Seoul YONHAP in English 0539 GMT  
24 Mar 94

[Text] Tokyo, March 24 (YONHAP)—North Korea is willing to reopen talks with the United States if the latter offers to suspend joint military exercises with South Korea and tries to solve the nuclear problem through dialogue, a Pyongyang official at the United Nations was quoted as saying Wednesday.

KYODO news service reported from New York that the North Korean official indicated his government would allow additional inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) if the United States came to the negotiating table.

The official offered neither a confirmation nor a denial when asked if North Korea and the United States had been in contact since the nuclear issue was referred to the UN Security Council.

"No comment," he was quoted as saying.

Washington canceled its scheduled March 21 high-level talks with Pyongyang after the stalinist state refused to allow full nuclear inspections by the IAEA.

The agency has referred the matter to the Security Council, which is preparing a resolution on North Korea for next week. Seoul and Washington, meanwhile, are seriously considering resumption of their joint military exercises "Team Spirit" this year.

The North Korean official expressed high hopes on the stance of Beijing, which has openly declared its opposition to any harsh action against Pyongyang such as sanctions.

"We have maintained friendly relations for over 40 years since the Korean war," KYODO quoted him as saying. "We will continue to strengthen these relations."

#### **Ambassador Warns of Effectuation of NPT Withdrawal**

SK2403041794 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean  
1010 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] A news conference was held yesterday [23 March] at the DPRK Embassy in Moscow. DPRK Ambassador Son Song-pil briefed Russian reporters on the DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement regarding the rupture of DPRK-U.S. talks.

Ambassador Son Song-pil pointed out that Pyongyang cannot but take countermeasures against pressure on resuming Team Spirit, an ROK-U.S. joint military exercise.

Last March, the DPRK declared its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT], but temporarily suspended its effectuation of such a decision last July so as to resume talks with the United States.

He pointed out that the DPRK cannot but implement its decision to withdraw from the NPT if the U.S. Administration breaks up talks with Pyongyang and resumes the Team Spirit exercise to step up the nuclear threat against the North.

He added: Continuing dialogue is also in the interest of the United States. We are not in any hurry as time is on our side.

#### **Envoy Says Government Not Bound by IAEA Obligations**

JN2303194494 Damascus SANA in Arabic 1735 GMT  
23 Mar 94

[Text] Damascus, 23 Mar (SANA)—Pak Di-Chun (name as received), ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Damascus, has said his country has decided not to send its delegation to the third round of Korean-U.S. negotiations. Nor will it continue to consider itself bound by its obligations to the International Atomic Energy Authority [IAEA].

In a statement to a SANA correspondent, the ambassador said this follows the distortion by the United States and the IAEA of the results of the recent inspection of its nuclear facilities. This was used as a pretext to pressure the DPRK.

He said his government took this measure based on the principles contained in the Korean-U.S. agreement reached in New York on 25 February 1994 which stipulate a simultaneous move on both sides to secure the full implementation of this agreement.

He said it is his government's firm and continuous position not to abide by its pledges to the United States as long as the latter is breaking its pledges.

The Korean ambassador noted that the United States resorted to distorting and fabricating the issue dealing with the IAEA's inspection. It used it as an excuse to resume joint military maneuvers with South Korea and to threaten the use of force to exert pressure against the Korean Government. Moreover, it reveals a U.S. intention to have the UN Security Council impose sanctions on his country. He said the United States should make an accurate and responsible assessment of the current situation.

The ambassador expressed his deep appreciation of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic for supporting his government's just and reasonable stand toward the nuclear issue.



### Deployment of Patriots Sees as 'Grave Threat'

SK2303054394 *Pyongyang KCNA in English 0531 GMT 23 Mar 94*

["Step To Drive Situation Into Extremes"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, March 23 (KCNA)—U.S. President Bill Clinton reportedly ordered the deployment of Patriot missiles in South Korea, saying the missiles would serve the interests of the United States and South Korea.

This is a provocative step to drive the situation into extremes by screwing up the tensions on the Korean peninsula.

Out of an intentional scheme to create an atmosphere of confrontation against the DPRK, the United States totally reversed the agreed conclusions reached between the DPRK and the U.S. at the New York contact on February 25 and broke off the DPRK-U.S. talks and now has become all the more undisguised in its military threats and pressure against the DPRK, saying the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises would be resumed.

Clinton's order of the deployment of Patriot missiles in South Korea is a grave threat to the DPRK, and it clearly shows that the United States is pushing the situation of the Korean peninsula to the brink of war.

### Reporting on Status of Missile Development

SK2003053394 *Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean 20 Mar 94 p 4*

[By reporter Yu Yong-won]

[Text] To what extent will North Korea's ground-to-ground missile be developed? The status quo of North Korea's missile development is gaining much interest after foreign news reported that North Korea is developing new ground-to-ground missiles tentatively named "Taepodong Nos. 1 and 2" with ranges from 2,000 to 3,500 km.

In connection with this, a government intelligence source said, "It is true that North Korea is developing new missiles with a range of 2,000 to 3,500 km. ROK and U.S. intelligence authorities are closely tracking this." With North Korea's development of new missiles, the first thing of concern is the relationship between the already known Nodong Nos. 1 and 2, and Taepodong Nos. 1 and 2.

North Korea began developing the Nodong No. 1 in 1989 and successfully test-launched it for the first time in May 1993. It has a range of 1,000 km which covers Tokyo, Japan but has not been deployed to an actual fighting position. The existence of the Nodong No. 2 was first known in last year's U.S. Senate report, but its specifications have not yet been confirmed. Its range is

estimated to be 1,500 to 2,000 km and a prototype is expected to be introduced next year.

The Taepodong Nos. 1 and 2 are the newest missiles discovered at a missile research center in Sanum-tong, Pyongyang by a U.S. spy satellite in February 1994. That was the first time the U.S. spy satellite discovered the missiles stacked in the open air with improved Scud B missiles and Nodong No. 1's. Judging from the size of the propellants, Taepodong No. 1 is estimated to have a range of 2,000 km, and Taepodong No. 2 approximately 3,500 km.

Considering that the range of the Taepodong No. 1 is estimated to be 2,000 km, ROK and U.S. intelligence officials are reportedly closely analyzing the possibility of this being the Nodong No. 2.

Specialists are focusing their attention to the background of the fact that North Korea developed various types of new missiles in only one year and keeps expanding the ranges of missiles.

Usually, it takes several years to develop just one type of missile and it is also questionable that North Korea keeps expanding the ranges, although only 1,000 km would cover the Korean peninsula and major regions of Japan.

Specialists believe that, as in the case of Nodong Nos. 1 and 2, the new missiles are being developed at the order of Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, for exports to the region, or are aimed to cover major U.S. bases in the Pacific, including Guam.

Others also point out that these may be false prototypes considering that North Korea displayed them in the open air knowing that they were under the surveillance of U.S. spy satellites.

Specialists analyze that even if North Korea develops and deploys Taepodong Nos. 1 and 2 in actual fighting, these will be of less threat to South Korea than Scud B or improved Scud B's because, like Nodong Nos. 1 and 2, Taepodong Nos. 1 and 2 also use a Scud B as the main body but reduce the weight of warheads to expand the range, and thus their accuracy and destructive power are inferior to those of the Scud B.

However, ROK and U.S. authorities believe that if North Korea's missile development continues with this trend, it may be able to develop strategic mid-range ballistic missiles with a 4,000 to 5,000-km range in the near future and create missile-phobia in Northeast Asia. The authorities are seeking various countermeasures while closely watching North Korea's missile development trend.

Status of Development of Ground-to-Ground Missiles by North Korea

Name of Missile	Range (km)	Weight of Warhead (kg)	Year Produced
Scud B	320-340	1,000	1985
Improved Scud B	500	700-800	1989
Nodong No. 1	1,000	800	1993
Nodong No. 2	1,500-2,000	?	1995 (projection)
Taepodong No. 1	2,000	?	?
Taepodong No. 2	3,500	?	?

### Defector on Pyongyang's Mass Destruction Weapons Arsenal

#### Nuclear Weapons Development 'Completed'

SK2203090794 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
0800 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] Yi Chung-kuk, a sergeant of the North Korean Army affiliated to the nuclear chemical defense bureau who defected on 18 March, said in a news conference on 22 March that North Korea is capable of killing all the people in the South with just the chemical weapons and bacterial weapons it now possesses.

Yi Chung-kuk said that currently North Korea has facilities that produce biochemical weapons and storage bases under the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces in various places. He also exposed that the chemical weapons are the most poisonous in the world.

He said he heard on several occasions beginning in 1991 from high-ranking military cadres and his senior officers that North Korea has already completed nuclear weapons development. When North Korea was receiving a special [tukpyol] inspection in March 1993 from the International Atomic Energy Agency, he said he heard from his senior officer that it will be of no use to inspect Yongbyon because nuclear weapons are being produced at another place.

#### YONHAP on Defector's Remarks

SK2203110394 Seoul YONHAP in English 1054 GMT  
22 Mar 94

[Text] Seoul, March 22 (YONHAP)—A North Korean Army sergeant who defected to the South last week said on Tuesday that the People's Army has bio-chemical weapons so toxic that they may kill or paralyze the whole 40 million South Korean people in the event of war.

Sfc. Yi Chung-kuk formerly of a North Korean CBR (Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare) unit told a press conference in Seoul that North Korea mass-produced bio-chemical weapons developed by the medical school of Kim Il-song University and People's Army Medical College.

"I heard laboratories tested newly developed bio-chemical weapons on living bodies of political prisoners," Yi said.

"It was also said that in an area near Chagang Province where a chemical plant is located, many nearby people suffered serious headache and pregnant women gave birth to deformed babies due to the leak of toxic substance in June last year."

He said high North Korean military officers used to encourage soldiers by saying that they had nothing to fear because the People's Army possesses nuclear arms.

Yi said he learned that North Korean officers trained at Soviet military academies cannot be promoted to general since a coup attempt by those taught at military academies in the former USSR was uncovered in October 1992.

About his defection, Yi said he left his home in Pyongyang on last Nov. 9 and smuggled himself to Yanji in northeastern China. He could come to South Korea through a third country with the help of ethnic Koreans in Yanji, he said.

Yi said that in the People's Army he served as a calculator at the "counter-nuclear and atomic analysis center" of nuclear and chemical defense bureau of the People's Army General Staff.

The duty of the analysis center is to assess a contaminated area, wind direction and other data in case CBR weapons are used in war and distribute the data obtained to all People's Army units, he said.

### SOUTH KOREA

#### Newspaper Reports Government Agrees To Deployment of Patriots

SK2103065394 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean  
21 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by reporter Kim Hyon-ik]

[Text] President Kim Yong-sam on 21 March called an urgent meeting of security-related ministers and discussed the crisis situation on the Korean peninsula created by the North Korean threat of war and its rejection of nuclear inspection, and decided an early

deployment of Patriot missiles and the resumption of the ROK-U.S. joint military exercise.

The meeting discussed the analyses of the present situation by the Agency for National Security Planning [NSP], the National Unification Board [NUB], the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of National Defense [MND], and discussed measures to cope with the situation. The meeting analyzed that there is little likelihood of North Korea making actual armed provocation, but decided to formulate preparatory measures for all the potential developments, including the North Korean armed provocation against the South.

At the meeting President Kim stressed that the ROK should defend peace on the Korean peninsula and that the ROK is capable of doing it, and requested the participants in the meeting to take all necessary measures to establish the posture to cope with any contingency.

The meeting assessed that North Korea will keep up even steeper tensions on the Korean peninsula in the short run, and decided to have an unidentified number of Patriot missiles deployed soon and get the Team Spirit joint military exercise resumed in April. The meeting also extensively discussed ways to build up the ROK-U.S. combined defense capability.

Initially the meeting was supposed to decide the timing of the resumption of the Team Spirit exercise watching North Korea's attitude, but since "even tougher steps," such as the withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] and replacing fuel rods, can be taken by North Korea, the meeting concluded that the Team Spirit exercise has to be conducted in April.

The meeting concluded that in view of the North Korean side's attitude of rupturing the envoy exchange on 19 March, the inter-Korean dialogue will have to be suspended for the time being, and confirmed the principle that the ROK will intensify international alliances by such means as participating in international sanctions by the IAEA and the UN Security Council.

The meeting decided that the ROK will closely cooperate with Japan and China to this end and that President Kim will take the matter up intensively during his visit to Japan and China.

The meeting decided that the ROK will explain to China—which is persistently advocating its principled position that the North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved peacefully—that international sanctions are unavoidable for peace and security in Northeast Asia. The meeting decided to request China to persuade North Korea in this connection.

The meeting also agreed that international sanctions will be reconsidered if North Korea admits its mistake, completely permits the IAEA inspections, thereby ensuring the nuclear transparency, and sincerely comes

to the inter-Korean dialogue for envoy exchange, before the UN Security Council decides sanctions.

The meeting, however, on the basis of its reflection that the appeasement policy toward the North brought about the North Korean insincerity and misjudgment, decided that the ROK will maintain a resolute position.

President Kim noted that North Korea intends to take advantage of the crisis atmosphere inspired by its raving about not hesitating a war despite the extreme economic difficulty it is suffering, and instructed the participants in the meeting to establish a military posture of countermeasures and to intensify public information activity for the people to prevent the people from turning restless.

Participating in the security-related ministers meeting held for the second time at Chongwadae [presidential residence] this year were Prime Minister Yi Hoe-chang; Yi Yong-tok, deputy prime minister and minister of the NUB; Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu; Minister of Home Affairs Choe Hyong-u; Defense Minister Yi Pyong-tae; NSP Director Kim Tok; Chon Yong-taek, director of contingency plans; Yi Yang-ho, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Pak Kwan-yong, secretary general of the Presidential Secretariat; Chong Chong-uk, senior presidential secretary for foreign and national security affairs; and Chu Ton-sik, presidential spokesman.

#### **Defense Minister Says Patriots To Be Included in Team Spirit**

*SK2303080794 Seoul YONHAP in English 0735 GMT 23 Mar 94*

[Text] Seoul, March 23 (YONHAP)—Defense Minister Yi Pyong-tae said Wednesday that the South Korean and U.S. Governments are discussing when to resume the Team Spirit military exercise, which will include Patriot missiles.

Yi told the National Assembly's National Defense Committee that the exercise may begin in late April, mid-May or sometime after that.

He said, "as North Korea failed to fulfill the two preconditions for suspension of Team Spirit, resumption of the exercise has become inevitable. The maximum number of U.S. Forces possible will take part in the exercise for maximum effect."

He explained that Team Spirit will include command post exercises and such practical maneuvers as river crossings and emergency landings.

North Korea walked out of the latest inter-Korean working-level contact on Saturday, rupturing the dialogue on exchanging special envoys, and warned Monday that it would withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) if Team Spirit was resumed this year.



In response to threats by Pyongyang, South Korea and the United States plan to deploy Patriot missiles near Seoul soon in preparation for an emergency.

The Patriots are expected to arrive here next month in time for Team Spirit.

Yi said, "Patriot anti-missile missiles will also be part of the exercise. One Patriot battalion can fight 55 incoming aircraft simultaneously and has the incidental capability of intercepting Scud missiles."

The government will decide the date for resumption of Team Spirit after considering the effect on farmers and likely outcome of the joint exercise.

"Once the government officially announces the resumption of Team Spirit, it will be difficult to suspend the exercise again," he said.

He did not rule out the possibility of North Korean provocation after the United Nations discusses possible economic sanctions.

"The government is working out countermeasures of two kinds—one before the U.N. Security Council decides on sanctions against North Korea and the other after the decision," he said.

Yi said Seoul and Washington will hold consultations after the Security Council makes a decision on sanctions.

If sanctions are imposed, he said North Korea may try to endure the pressure but would eventually be compelled to accede to the council's demands.

"But if Pyongyang judges the United Nations' deterrent power is not enough to defeat it, you cannot rule out that possibility and it may choose military provocation," he said.

#### Dailies React to Decision To Deploy Patriots

SK2303092794

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of articles in Seoul vernacular newspapers published on 23 March reacting to the U.S. and ROK decision to deploy Patriots missiles to the ROK.

The moderate KYONGHYANG SINMUN on page 3 carries a 900-word article by Washington-based correspondent Yi Chong-yeon entitled: "The Background Behind the U.S. Decision To Deploy Patriots." The article notes that in the wake of the rupture of North-South contacts, the U.S. policy toward North Korea has shifted from "diplomatic negotiations" to "exercising pressure" and reports "the deployment of Patriots has brought up speculation that the United States will impose gradual pressure on North Korea by demonstrating its power." The article notes: "The deployment of Patriots is apparently aimed at grasping the initiative on the nuclear issue, rather than giving up dialogue with North Korea."

While noting that the United States is assuming a two-pronged stance toward North Korea—demonstrating power while taking a cautious approach on North Korea—the article reports the diplomatic goal of the United States is "not isolating North Korea from the international community, but inducing it to join in the international nuclear order." The article notes that the United States is not giving up its efforts for dialogue since it estimates that a UN resolution will have little effect on North Korea and that it is not in the interest of the United States to heighten the tension on the Korean peninsula. The article predicts "chances are high that the North Korean nuclear issue will be back on the negotiating table after a cooling-off period."

The moderate HANGUK ILBO on page 3 carries a 900-word article by Washington-based correspondent Yi Sang-sok entitled: "The United States is Taking a Cautious Approach on North Korea." The article writes: "It is ironic that the U.S. decision on the Patriots has a diplomatic meaning rather than a military one." Reporting that the Patriots will take more than a month to reach the ROK, the article notes "that leaves plenty of time for the U.S. Government to try diplomatic persuasion to pry open North Korea's nuclear facilities for international inspection. This shows that the United States wants to go the extra mile with diplomacy before considering military steps on the North."

Recalling that the U.S. Government announced its plan on the deployment earlier than expected, the article interprets this move as "U.S. efforts to maximize its firm stance on the North Korean nuclear issue by coordinating the timing with the UN Security Council's discussions on the issue." The article concludes: "The United States will not give up its efforts to peacefully resolve the nuclear issue."

The left-leaning HANGYORE SINMUN on page 2 carries a 700-word article by O Tae-kyu from the "Fluoroscope" column. The article recalls the past commitments made by high-level ROK Government officials that they will not bring in the Patriots and then expresses regret that "with the North Korean chief delegate's remark on turning Seoul into a fireball, the deployment of Patriots has become a resolute issue inside the government." The article points out the deployment is "a by-product of a shrewd trick of U.S. arms dealers who are making the most of the current tense situation." Noting that the issue on deploying the Patriots was not included in the North Korean-U.S. agreement reached in New York, the article writes: "The U.S. and ROK Governments, however, decided to deploy the Patriots missiles as soon as the North-South contact ruptured, giving an impression that they were hoping for it," and maintains that an "immediate decision on the deployment, which was made under the pretext of the rupture of North-South contact, is a jump of logic." The article urges the government to

clearly manifest the background behind such a decision to allay the people's suspicion on the deployment.

**Politicians React to Rupture of North-South Talks**  
*SK2103063194 Seoul YONHAP in English 0602 GMT*  
*21 Mar 94*

[Text] Seoul, March 21 (YONHAP)—"If war breaks out, Seoul will turn into a sea of fire!"

These vicious words spat out by the chief North Korean delegate to the inter-Korean working-level contact last Saturday stunned even those South Koreans who have become inured to violent language from the North.

As the full weight of North Korea's statement and other harsh remarks sank in, Seoul government officials and politicians scurried in search of countermeasures.

Both the ruling and opposition parties held official meetings Monday to condemn North Korea's statement and urge Pyongyang once again to continue inter-Korean dialogue.

At a meeting of Democratic Liberal Party postholders, almost everybody took up the "sea-of-fire" remark and pressed the government to map out and pursue a consistent North Korea policy.

DLP Chairman Kim Chong-pil said, "The North Korean nuclear problem is indeed very serious, but it appears many South Koreans appear to be little concerned."

"There are still people in the South who insist on holding behind-the-scenes talks with the North," Kim Chong-pil said. "However, we will have to wake up from such illusion and prepare to meet the situation quietly but strongly with firm resolution."

Rep. Yi Se-ki, chairman of the DLP Policy Committee, noted past criticism that the Seoul government has been too optimistic about the North Korean nuclear issue and too dependent on the United States.

"There has also been criticism that the government lacks a consistent North Korea policy," Yi said.

The ruling party, he added, has been reviewing the government policy on North Korea and urging President Kim Yong-sam's administration to deal squarely with the latest developments.

Rep. Yi Han-tong, DLP floor leader at the National Assembly, said he plans to confer with the party leadership on a move to convene the foreign affairs and national unification committee to work out measures on the parliamentary level.

Rep. So Su-chong called on the military to take urgent steps in order to dispel the anxiety felt by ordinary citizens.

DLP Spokesman Ha Sun-pong said in a statement that the remark about "the sea of fire, which is practically a declaration of war, debased the dignity of South Koreans."

"We condemn North Korea for making such violent remarks, threatening war and inciting riots in South Korea," he said. "The North Korean remarks are anti-Korean people and an anti-unification action."

Seoul should keep open a dialogue channel with Pyongyang, but it will have to maintain a firm and resolute position in its negotiations with the North, Ha said.

The main opposition Democratic Party reacted strongly to the North Korean threat, while at the same time urging the Seoul and Washington governments to continue serious efforts to engage in dialogue.

The DP held a supreme council meeting Monday morning and decided to demand an emergency meeting of the foreign affairs and national unification committee to hear a government report on the issue.

In a special statement, adopted at Monday's meeting, the party declared that "there should be no war under any circumstances." It expressed regret over the North Korean threat of warfare which, it said, had shocked peace-loving South Koreans as well as all other people in the world.

"North Korea has to accept IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities," the statement said.

"It also is not proper for the United States to make a hasty decision on the resumption of the Team Spirit military exercise and a possible deployment of Patriot anti-missile missiles," the DP statement said.

It asserted that the opposition party opposes any confrontation or heightening of tension on the Korean peninsula. Instead, South and North Korea and the United States must continue to talk in order to break the nuclear impasse.

The minor opposition United People's Party said it strongly condemns North Korea for rupturing inter-Korean dialogue and threatening to turn Seoul into a sea of fire.

In a statement read by spokesman Kim Su-il, the party called on North Korea to go with the changing current in the world.

**Dallies on Rupture in North-South Contacts**  
*SK2303030694*

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of editorials from Seoul vernacular press published on 22 March on the rupture of North-South working-level contacts for the exchange of special envoys and remarks made by senior North Korean delegate at the 19 March contact.

The conservative daily CHOSON ILBO publishes on page 3 a 1,200-word editorial entitled: "How Can They Threaten War?" Describing the "venomous remarks" made by the North Korean delegate during the eighth working-level contact that "Seoul is not far from here. If a war breaks out, Seoul will become a sea of fire and you cannot survive," as "shuddering," the editorial reports his remarks disclosed the "true color" of North Korea. The editorial expresses doubts that North Korea can hardly become a "dialogue partner" in peacefully resolving the nation's problems and that "no nation" in the international community "supports" the North Korean position. Stressing that the international community cannot have "perseverance" if North Korea persists in an "unreasonable policy" regarding North-South relations and the nuclear issue, the editorial notes that our side is "well aware" of North Korean capabilities and will take "resolute countermeasures" when North Korea commits an act of "disturbing" the peace of the world. The editorial urges the North to ponder "coolly" the consequences of its radical hard-line steps and to act with discretion. Otherwise, the "collapse" of the Kim Il-sung system and "North Korean-style socialism" will be "expedited."

CHOSON ILBO publishes on page 3 a 1,300-word editorial entitled: "We Reprove the Government." Defining the incumbent government's policies on diplomacy, security, reunification, and North Korea as a "comprehensive failure," the editorial calls on the Kim Yong-sam government to keenly realize the current "very serious situation," and reports that the North side's "intentional mockery and threat" including the "Seoul in a sea of fire" remarks made by the North delegate at "official talks" are the result of the government's "easy-going" policy on North Korea, which has been implemented for the past one year. Stressing that the security issue is the greatest national issue, which will go into "bankruptcy" even by "one error," the paper urges the government to have "a sense of shame" for the recent "blow" dealt by North Korea. Describing the current events as a "grave situation," the editorial criticizes the Kim Yong-sam government's appointment of "gentlemen," who lack the sense of reality and "practical experience," to the posts of handling the North Korean issues and of dealing with North Korea's strategy of "hiding a bayonet behind a smile." Assessing the "security-related ministers' conference" as a meeting of those who failed in working out proper measures against North Korea by using up all "cards," the paper strongly urges that the government should present "appropriate measures" instead of "prescriptions" made out after the patient has died.

The moderate daily HANGUK ILBO publishes on page 3 a 1,300-word editorial entitled: "Full-Scale Preparations Should Be Made for Provocation." Noting that the people are worried about North Korea's provocative remarks on war, the editorial stresses that high-level officials in charge of diplomatic and security affairs should "closely examine" the

reason the situation has "worsened." Pointing out that the "attitude" of the government's diplomatic, unification, and security teams toward the North made the people "worry," the editorial criticizes "the nation-first policy," "national welfare theory" and "incoherent" diplomacy against North Korea, which invariably seeks "communization" of the South. The editorial reports that "opposition" of deployment of Patriot missiles to U.S. Forces in the ROK, which was expressed by the government claiming that this would "incite" North Korea, and the policy of separating the North Korean nuclear issue from "economic cooperation," were the result of the government's "inconsistent" policy. Stressing that North Korean military power, sought even amid severe economic difficulties, is still "enormous," the paper introduces that "three mechanized corps and tanks corps and two artillery corps" have been deployed within 80 km from the Military Demarcation Line.

Noting it is important for the government to further strengthen its "security and defense posture" and for the people to heighten "vigilance" against North Korea, the paper urges the government not to assume a "wavering" attitude toward the North so the people will "trust" and "follow" the government.

The independent moderate daily MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN publishes on page 3 a 1,100-word editorial entitled: "Where is North Korea Heading?" Expressing concern with the North Korean side's "radical remarks" on "willingness for war" made during the working-level contact, the editorial points out that one cannot understand such remarks with "common sense" and that the North Korean authorities are likely attempting to "gain time" for nuclear development. Stressing that "strong countermeasures" are the only solution to the problem, the paper calls on the government to strengthen diplomatic efforts to maintain an "international cooperative system" in the course of dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue and to prevent the situation from advancing to an "extreme phase." The editorial maintains that a "tight defensive system" should be established to cope with the "reckless challenge" by North Korea.

The pro-government daily SEOUL SINMUN publishes on page 3 a 2,300-word editorial, under the headline, "We Should Resolutely Respond to Threat on 'Sea of Fire'." Saying that an "extremely serious situation" has developed following the North Korean delegate's remarks at the North-South contact, the editorial urges a reexamination of our own "internal posture" to cope with this situation. Assessing the purpose of North Korea's expression of a willingness for war as part of its "negotiation strategy" to strengthen its own system of rule, to provoke our "sense of anxiety" and create confusion within our society, and to "alienate" the ROK, Japan, and the United States in "international arena," the paper observes that the North's actions might have been prompted by our own "weak points" such as the



slackening of security since the inauguration of the civilian government. Urging the government to reexamine the nation's overall security posture, the editorial particularly urges leading figures in society to encourage the people to "establish" a new outlook on the nation's security. Stressing that war can be prevented only by "advance preparations," the paper calls for strengthening internal unity to cope against any provocation.

The moderate KYONGHYANG SINMUN publishes on page 3 a 1,200-word editorial entitled, "We Are Concerned With the Nation's Security." Noting that, regardless of North or South, all will be reduced to ashes if a war breaks out on the Korean peninsula, the editorial expresses "shock" at the North Korean delegate's remarks on Seoul becoming "a sea of fire," and points out that North Korea cannot evade the international community's "spearhead of attack." The paper, however, asks whether we are "willing and capable" of coping with such "unpredictable acts" of North Korea and whether we have enough arms to do so. The paper criticizes our diplomatic team as "too weak" to dissipate the uneasiness of the people, and as being "naïve" and lacking in clear, firm principles.

The left-leaning HANGYORE SINMUN publishes on page 3 a 1,300-word editorial under the headline, "Catastrophe in North-South Dialogue Should Be Avoided." Noting that hasty and narrow-minded people are worried about the possibility of war, the editorial writes that the South's "acute reaction" to the North's "bombshell declaration" on a readiness to answer dialogue for dialogue and war with war was responsible for the rupture in North-South talks. The paper then points out that the nation's "future" was now more likely to being a target of "bargaining" between big powers.

Opposing an "extreme attitude" against the North Korea as ineffective due to the likelihood of North Korea further aggravating military tension in order to appease a public sentiment that will arise following economic sanctions. The paper implores the North and the South to agree to a working-level contact over the telephone as soon as possible and to resolve this problem through dialogue and discussion, as they would a "matrimonial quarrel."

#### Acquiring 'Dual-Use' Advanced Weapons Technology

WA2502210894

[Editorial Report] Press articles written last year by members of South Korea's military and civilian S&T establishments call for a "coordinated program" to develop "dual-use" technologies that can be used to manufacture highly advanced weapons "if the need arises." Although unequivocal evidence that such a policy is being adopted has not been observed in Seoul media reporting, articles on several new technologies and equipment types that qualify as "dual-use" by

standard criteria have appeared over the past few months in ROK and Japanese publications. Seoul press sources note that any efforts by the ROK to acquire advanced weapons components or technology would be enhanced by S&T agreements recently concluded with Russia, China, and Israel.

#### Dual-Use Technology for an 'Uncertain' Future

In the past year, several articles have appeared in the ROK press urging the government to support "dual-use" technology as a hedge against an uncertain future. For example, the December 1992 issue of Seoul KUKBANG KWA KISUL argued that changes in the world's geopolitical relationships have made it impossible for South Korea to defend itself by relying on foreign equipment and technology. Not only are traditional suppliers reluctant to transfer technology, the defense requirements themselves are changing, forcing South Korea to "consider medium and long-term plans to secure the military power to deal with countries on the periphery through S&T development for national defense and qualitatively superior weapons systems." The journal claimed that the key to both problems lies in "strengthening the bonds" between government and the defense industry, and for South Korea to use its own technology to develop "sophisticated independent weapons systems."

The same journal in its May 1993 issue featured an article by a nuclear engineer from South Korea's Agency for Defense Development (ADD) on the need to apply nuclear technology to national defense. The article maintained that the distinction between civilian and military use of nuclear technology is not clear, and that products with defense applications can be "derived" by making improvements in how the ROK uses nuclear power. KUKBANG KWA KISUL highlighted the ADD engineer's remark that "we must vigorously invest right now in research and development of the nuclear power industry, so that we can make use of it under new conditions if the situation changes. We have to maintain at least a technical capability."

Similarly, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute of Science and Technology's (KIST's) Policy Management Research Institute wrote in the July 1993 issue of KUKBANG KWA KISUL that "South Korea needs to establish a new policy that can achieve the two national goals of economic development and national security." What is needed, according to the KIST researcher, is a "coordinated program" to develop "dual-use technology" with both civilian and military applications, that will enable South Korea to "deal with changes as the need arises." The 4 August 1993 CHUGAN MAEGYONG made the same basic plea for "dual technologies," developed through coordination between the ROK's Defense Ministry, the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE), and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). In the 30 August 1993 MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN (MKS), the head of the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), which was directly responsible for two of the dual-use projects listed below, wrote that South

Korea's present task is to create an independent national defense based on high technology appropriate to the post-cold war era and developed through greater cooperation between the military and industrial sectors.

#### **New Technology, Equipment With Potential Weapons Applications**

Recent ROK and Japanese media reports describe some commercial technologies developed or acquired by South Korean companies and government institutes, which conceivably could be used to design or manufacture highly advanced weapons. For some of these technologies, the potential military applications are obvious; others are more generic, with possible uses in a number of high-tech weapons programs. All qualify by widely accepted criteria as "dual-use" in the sense described above.

1. An "electron beam welder" developed jointly by the Korea Institute of Machinery and Metals (KIMM) and Korea Ion. The device reportedly cost 200 million won (\$250,000) to develop, and can be used for precision welding and to join metals of different types (23 October 1993 MKS).
2. An "ion nitriding electric furnace" and "numerical-controlled gas cutting machinery" by the same institute (29 December 1993 CHUGAN MAEGYONG). Of the 18 dedicated institutes within MOST, KIMM's 1994 S&T budget at \$70 million is the third largest after the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute and the Nuclear Environment Management Center (1 January 1994 MKS). According to KIMM's director, the Taedok-based institute plans to "greatly increase its testing and evaluation functions for advanced machinery and equipment and expand related activities" in 1994 (7 January 1994 MKS).
3. An "ultra-high precision (nanometer scale) lathe" developed by KAIST, also located at Taedok (29 December 1993 CHUGAN MAEGYONG).
4. High-speed "image processing equipment" to observe "how molecules of a material undergoing a disintegrating reaction are spatially distributed." Developed by a team from KAIST's chemical research laboratory, the equipment uses a high-energy charge coupled device for "direct observation of the size and form of the disintegrating material's distribution in three dimensions." Only three institutions in the world reportedly have this equipment: Sandia Labs, and two universities in the United States and Japan (22 January 1994 MKS).
5. Manufacturing technology for instruments able to measure high pressure, from an (unidentified) Russian research institute. The item is one of several technologies reportedly being obtained by ROK firms through R&D contracts with Russia, according to the 11 September 1993 HANGUK KYONGJE SINMUN (HKS).
6. A high-energy capacitor able to withstand severe shock, extreme temperatures, and to operate in a vacuum, developed by Daewoo (9 June 1993 CHUGAN MAEGYONG).
7. Technology for a "solid fuel rocket engine" able to lift a 50-70 kg payload to an altitude of 80-90 km, by the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI). Projected performance doubles that achieved by South Korea's indigenous KSR-420s rockets launched in 1993, and gives the ROK the ability to develop a "rocket booster that meets South Korea's particular needs" (29 December 1993 CHUGAN MAEGYONG).
8. A "small gas turbine" to be developed by Korea Air for commercial use in generating electricity and as a prototype to develop related technology "for such things as aircraft engines" (5 January 1994 MKS). KIMM's director also stated, without mentioning the Korea Air project, that his institute would "indigenize" a "small gas turbine engine" (7 January 1994 MKS).
9. An "inertial navigation system" (INS) by Korea Air. The company plans to acquire aviation electronics technology through a buyout of Litton Korea, "a firm which specializes in INS equipment" (5 January 1994 MKS).
10. A pilotless helicopter used to spread seeds and agricultural chemicals, being developed by Daewoo Heavy Industries in cooperation with Russian scientists (April 1993 SIN TONGA, 5 April 1993 CHOSON ILBO).
11. A "Cray model C916 supercomputer," reportedly the company's most powerful, for KIST's Systems Engineering Research Institute. The computer reportedly will be used for "structural analysis and fluid mechanics simulations, weather forecasting, and researching environmental problems" (30 June 1993 Tokyo NIKKEI SANGYO).
12. A "computer software research center" established in Moscow by Samsung Electronics. Samsung, a major defense contractor, hopes to take advantage of the "large number of high-level military software development technicians who were trained in the former Soviet Union," and plans to become involved in joint projects with Russian Government research agencies (29 November 1993 Tokyo NIKKEI SANGYO).

#### **Foreign S&T Agreements Conducive to Weapons Technology Transfer**

South Korean efforts to acquire dual-use technologies presumably would be enhanced by S&T agreements recently signed with three major arms and arms technology exporting countries—Russia, China, and Israel—a fact duly noted in the ROK press. Russia in particular has attracted South Korean media attention

by its reported offers to barter advanced weapons (24 January 1994 CHUNGANG ILBO) and "enriched uranium" (25 January 1994 YONHAP) to repay its ROK debts. Infrastructure is already in place for acquiring other types of sophisticated Russian technology. In addition to various "S&T cooperative centers" and "industrial cooperation information centers" established in Russia during the past year, the ROK Government operates at least two organizations aimed at recruiting Russian scientists and transferring advanced technology, through MOST (13 October 1993 HKS) and MOTIE (9 November 1993 MKS).

Arrangements to acquire Russian aerospace technology have been concluded by South Korea's three largest defense contractors, Daewoo Heavy Industries (8 January 1993 MKS), Samsung Aerospace (1 August 1993 HKS), and Hyundai—which reportedly sent some 30 PhD's to Russia to study "satellite technology" (31 July 1993 HKS), and has a joint venture with the aerospace firm Yakolev (5 November 1993 CHUNGANG ILBO). A 24 December 1992 CHUGAN CHOSON report describes how an unnamed South Korean company was able to bribe a Russian technician to hand over electronics technology that could not be obtained through formal channels; the incident suggests another route through which Russian weapons technology could be transferred.

On 5 November 1993, YONHAP reported some details of an S&T agreement signed by China and the ROK on 20 September 1993, including joint development of a "multipurpose satellite, aircraft design and testing technology, and medical lasers." The satellite project was interpreted by YONHAP as "paving the way for a Sino-Korean partnership in the defense industry." Citing "diplomatic sources," YONHAP also noted that "cooperation in nuclear energy may be not only in the reactor sector but could possibly develop into closer and wider partnership in the field." In addition, the 5 October 1993 CHOSON ILBO reported an agreement with Israel for scientific cooperation on several levels. The paper observed that Israel, which is shifting much of its state-funded research from military to civilian projects, is entering the agreement partly out of "concern about employment for its high-level S&T personnel in defense-related industries."

## THAILAND

### No Radioactive Substances Detected in Metal Boxes

BK2003132194 Bangkok THE SUNDAY POST in English  
20 Mar 94 p 3

[Text] No traces of uranium or other radioactive substances have been detected in the metal boxes seized at the Thai-Cambodian border and suspected to contain uranium.

Several metal boxes, each painted "uranium" in English on one side were seized by police in Aranyaprathet over a month ago.

They were later sent to the Office of Atomic Energy for Peace for examination.

In a press statement issued on Friday, the office said it carried out radioactive and X-ray fluorescent examinations of the boxes and its contents.

The findings showed no traces of uranium or other radioactive substances, the office added.

The office said it had twice before examined similar kinds of metal boxes and the results showed a low emission of radioactivity.

### Government Plans To Buy Third Nuclear Reactor in 1995

BK2803032394 Bangkok THE NATION in English  
28 Mar 94 pp A1, A7

[Text] The government plans to buy a third nuclear reactor for research purposes next year. Seven international companies are expected to bid for the construction contract of a new Bt4.5 billion atomic centre in Nakhon Nayok province.

Suchat Mongkhonphantha, secretary general of the Office of Atomic Energy for Peace (OAEP), claimed yesterday that feedback to the proposal from local residents was "positive".

The centre, to be built on 316-rai of land in Nakhon Nayok's Ongkharak district, will include a five-to-10 megawatt reactor, a laboratory for atomic isotope production, a chemical nuclear laboratory, a radioactive waste management plant and other nuclear facilities for scientific and medical purposes, he said.

However, resident groups in the province told THE NATION they are concerned that the OAEP had not given them full information.

They were worried about possible radioactive contamination of the environment and waterways. They had also not been told about safety measures or how to behave in case of an accident.

"OAEP public relations officers only informed us how the new centre will be useful in terms of scientific and economic progress," said a resident of Ongkharak who asked not to be named.

"But as local residents here, we also need to know about the possible negative effects—whether it will pose a danger to our health and the environment.

"We need more details about the transportation route of radioactive fuel and waste management."

Suchat said the OAEP office will also be relocated to the new site from its 30-year-old office on Bangkok's Wiphawadi Rangsit Road, about eight km from Don Muang International Airport.



International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations require nuclear reactors to be at least 14 km away from an airport to diminish any danger from an aviation accident.

The seven firms expected to bid for the project are: Atomic Energy Canada Ltd, the US-based General Atomic, Technicatome from France, Siemens from Germany, Invapp from Argentina, C. Zec from China and a Japanese consortium.

OAEP and the Bechtell International, a US consultancy company, will draft the terms of reference (ToR) for the project, Suchat said. Contractors will be invited to discuss the ToR before submitting their bids. OAEP expects to select a contractor by January next year.

Construction will start after preparation of a Safety Analysis Report, which will include an environmental impact assessment. The Nuclear Facility Regulation Centre, based in the OAEP office, and the National Environmental Board will examine the report.

"We expect construction and establishment of a new nuclear reactor and other facilities to be completed in 1998," Suchat said.

OAEP spends about Bt4 million annually purchasing Uranium-235 from General Atomic for its present two-MW reactor, Suchat said. Waste from the plant is treated and stored at the OAEP office on Wiphawadi Rangsit.

"The solid waste is stored in 200-litre buckets after being treated. There are about 200 buckets of low-level radioactive waste being stored here," said an OAEP's waste management specialist.

"OAEP also encourages hospitals to send their wastes to us for treatment. Therefore, our space is almost full. Treatment and storage will be moved to the new centre when it is completed," she said.

Liquid waste from the plant such as radioactively-contaminated water is released, after being treated, into the waterway in front of the OAEP office building before flowing into a canal in Bang Khen area.

She said the office monitors the water closely.

The new research reactor will be the third in the country. The first, a one-MW reactor, was given to Thailand by the United States under the Atoms For Peace Programme of President Dwight Eisenhower in 1961. The government paid Bt16 million to purchase the second, two-MW reactor from General Atomic in 1977.

Suchat said the new atomic centre will also give priority to staff training in preparation for the future if Thailand decides to build a nuclear power plant.

#### **Association Requests Decision on Nuclear Power 'Soon'**

BK2503033494 Bangkok *THE NATION* in English  
25 Mar 94 p A4

[Text] The Science and Technology Association has urged the government to decide soon whether to build nuclear power plants or not, Chairman Phanot Mikasen said yesterday.

Phanot, who claimed that the nuclear option was safe, said the government should decide soon because nuclear power plants take 10 years to complete.

"We have to get prepared for so many things," he said, citing lack of expertise as an example.

Compared with fossil fuels, nuclear power is clean. It doesn't release carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Phanot said.

Current resources such as lignite and water are becoming scarcer and consequently will become more expensive, he said.

"Nuclear power is the most suitable energy for Thailand," Phanot said.

With cooperation from Canadian experts, he said the association is studying technology regarding the disposal of radioactive waste.

The association is also coordinating with the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand to train new people.

## BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

### 'Karadzic's Terrorists' Use Chemical Agents in Bihac Region

AU2203154894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic]

[Excerpt] There have been new artillery-infantry attacks on the defenders' lines on the Grmusko-Srbijanski plateau, Hasin Vrh, and the Bihac part of the front. The hundreds of howitzer, mortar, and tank shells that have landed on parts of the defense lines and the shelling of Cazin, Bihac, and the surrounding areas this afternoon mark the 43d day of the Serbian aggressor's offensives on the Bihac region.

Our defenders are heroically resisting the wolves from Mount Ozren who have again arrived on the Bihac front. The fact that they used chemical agents in attacks today sufficiently illustrates the behavior by Karadzic's terrorists. When they failed to break the defenders' resistance, they turned against city districts. Substantial material damage was caused in Cazin. Some civilians were wounded, but fortunately no one was killed.

In addition, the rage by Abdic's paramilitary has continued in the border areas of the Cazin municipality. The targets of secessionists' attacks are the same ones they have been mercilessly destroying and torching since last night. They are also killing domestic animals and expelling people. A large number of refugees from these areas, especially from Krivaja, Liskovac, and (?Trzac), arrived in Cazin today. [passage omitted]

## CZECH REPUBLIC

### Allegations of Biological Weapons Development

#### Rumors of Illegal Bacterial Cultures

AU2103173494 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 18 Mar 94 p 3

[Jan Benes commentary: "Illegal Bacteria"]

[Text] Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Chernobyl enriched the world by the knowledge of the appearance of nuclear death. The beginning of the nuclear age was announced by an act of war in the war that the United States neither began nor provoked. It took place at the time when the consequences were not known. The Chernobyl accident took place at the time when the consequences were known. Nevertheless, our subervient state leadership did practically nothing to protect the society against the aftermath of this accident. The crime of public endangerment, which then took place, has not been punished.

A journalist must not swallow any bait, nor can he miss any alarming news. The rumors about SS-20 missiles "forgotten" by the occupational power [on Czech territory] are among the things that simply cannot be missed. That is true despite the fact that one must know how to use a flare, or a warhead, and an explosion accidentally triggered by a layman is less likely than by an incompetent manipulation with a hand grenade.

The situation was worse when unverifiable rumors referred to a warhead with a chemical warfare agent. It was just the more "poignant" as both the Soviets and Czechoslovakia once promised that they would not keep such warfare agents.

Moreover, the treaties in which the USSR and former Czechoslovakia vouch that they will not use bacteriological or virological weapons would make a respectable library. It is not only that they promised not to use the weapons—they actually promised not to have them.

Of course, some disease cultures, bacteria, and viruses are stored and cultivated for scientific reasons, even in the civilian sector. There are, however, long series of treaties and agreements that specify where and how. Under no circumstances, however, at a single location or even a single country. If they have, for instance, smallpox in Stockholm, then they do not have typhoid, which in turn is, let us say, in Milan. These treaties and agreements are also binding for the Czech Republic.

Nevertheless, the cultures, and in a form ready for combat use, have been and are here. In our army, completing its transformation and under the leadership of a Christian minister, who should know something about it? Our top brass, as is well known, are founding businesses, consortia, etc. You will find a small civilian business under the name of Klinlab also in the Central Military Hospital building. Similar cultures were brought there from Techonin in eastern Bohemia, where they were cultivated for the Warsaw Pact. They are stored in the Central Military Hospital contrary to all the aforementioned documentation. It is simply a commonplace company, equipped, however, at the expense of the Army, i.e. at the expense of the ordinary taxpayer. All this with the knowledge of the reformed General Nekvasil. Even his economic deputy, Kalousek, knew about it, for he approved the purchase of the equipment for the Klinlab company, which was certainly not cheap.

As we have managed to ascertain, the serum banks stored in the Military Hospital building contain gel ready for immediate use. Hence, a catastrophe can be set off by trickling out small pox, bubonic plague, or psittacosis etc., in the subway for instance.

An unintentional release could threaten Prague with, at least, the fate of Sverdlovsk (it is now called Ekaterinburg again), where a bacteriological warfare agent was

released into the ventilation system of the local "pharmaceuticals factory" and, subsequently, mysterious epidemics broke out in the city. An unknown epidemic pneumonia was the most common cause of death.

In the Czech Army, the bacteriological and virological death received the mark PTZD [prisne tajne, zvlastni dulezitost]—top secret, privileged information. The Central Military Hospital in Prague, in the building of which the Klinlab is located, is a military zone, where the police has no business. At the same time, it is also accessible to hospital visitors on the weekends, and, of course, to outpatients. This means that it is generally accessible. The building itself can even be accessed underground.

The building has been visited occasionally by a certain Colonel Zaykov and Mr. Frolov. Colonel Zaykov used to be a KGB attache, while Mr. Frolov was an adviser at the Foreign Trade Ministry. Currently, they both hold valid cards for foreigners with permanent residence here, and engage in business. How about selling these cultures to, let us say, Libya. Let us hope that the appropriate authorities will deal with this case in all seriousness.

#### **Former Director Claims No Bacteria Developed**

AU2103125894 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES  
in Czech 18 Mar 94 p 2

["(lek)"-signed report: "The Military Institute Did Not Develop Biological Weapons, Says Propper"]

[Text] Hradec Kralove—The former Military Research Institute in Techonin in the Orlicke Mountains (now the J.E. Purkyne Military Medical Academy Institute of Immunology and Microbiology) did not develop in the past—nor is it doing so at present—bacteriological weapons. This statement was made yesterday by Petr Propper, the institute's former director. "The institute dealt exclusively with defense-related research," he said.

Propper described as false the claim in CESKY DENIK that dangerous strains of bacteria and viruses, in whose development the Techonin-based research institute was involved, are stored in various locations in the Czech Republic.

According to Josef Fusek, the rector of the Military Medical Academy in Hradec Kralove, no bacterial or viral strains with transmuted immunological properties were ever developed at the institute. Fusek also denied that cholera, plague, smallpox, meningitis, or psittacosis germs would have been stored in the institute's laboratory. According to him, the research concerned other infectious diseases, for example, tularemia.

A commission of experts visited the Techonin institute last week—on the order of Defense Minister Antonin Baudys—where they carried out an inspection and

destroyed the cultures that will no longer be used for current research, said Fusek.

According to staff from the Charles University Faculty of Medicine Institute of Microbiology, strains of all the existing bacteria and viruses—including cholera, plague, smallpox, and other diseases—are stored in a number of microbiological laboratories. The way they store and dispose of them is, of course, subject to the regulations of the World Health Organization, which rules out any threat to the population.

The Defense Ministry will not, according to its Press Department, respond to the report in CESKY DENIK.

#### **Liquidation of Bacteria, Viral Strains Reported**

AU2103145694 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech  
19 Mar 94 p 1

[Jan Benes and Lubor Kohout report: "The Viral and Bacterial Strains Stored in the Central Military Hospital Are Destroyed Posthaste"]

[Text] In the CESKY DENIK on Thursday and Friday [17 and 18 March], we have reported the existence of still-maintained bacterial and viral strains developed for use as biological weapons. According to the findings by the CESKY DENIK reporters, one of the banks of these strains was concealed in the Central Military Hospital in Prague-Stresovice.

Yesterday, Czech Defense Minister Antonin Baudys called an extraordinary news conference; as he phrased it, "just to calm down the public."

Antonin Baudys declared that he was first informed about the existence of the particularly dangerous viruses and bacteria on 13 February of this year. Subsequently, he received more information from various sources on 17 February. On the basis of this information, an interdepartmental commission was formed, in which Health Ministry experts were also represented. The commission, according to Baudys, investigated and assessed the situation, and also decided to liquidate the biological bank quickly because it was "no longer useful." The bacterial and viral cultures were also destroyed under extraordinary security measures between 24 and 25 February with the knowledge and instructions of Defense Minister Antonin Baudys and Army Chief of Staff Nekvasil. Furthermore, Baudys said that similar measures were also taken in the Techonin Military Research Institute at the beginning of March. It was precisely in this Institute that, according to the CESKY DENIK sources, biological weapons for the Warsaw Pact were developed. According to claims by the military representatives, however, this bank of biological cultures was a commonplace affair, and their maintenance did not violate any international treaties.

An employee of the Techonin Military Research Institute, Ales Macela, stated that in the facility where he



works, no viral or bacterial strains have been cultivated for use in biological warfare. Moreover, he claimed that all documentation about the research has remained in Techonin. According to him, the research was conducted for defense purposes only. According to CESKY DENIK sources, however, the documentation was transferred to Prague under extraordinary security measures at the beginning of March.

Deputy Defense Minister Kalousek said that the Klinlab company had leased nonresidential premises in the Central Military Hospital building. It was precisely in the laboratories operated by this company that the bank of viral and bacterial cultures that were quickly destroyed on 25 February was stored.

### Baudys' Conduct Criticized

AU2303122694 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech  
21 Mar 94 p 3

[Lubor Kohout commentary: "From Baudys' Realm of Fantasy"]

[Text] Fairy tales are meant for children; of course, some adults like them too. Especially the old, traditional ones. The appeal of modern fairy tales is not so strong. Defense Minister Antonin Baudys, with the support of his subordinates, told us one like this last Friday [18 March]. The minister deemed it necessary to respond to the articles published in CESKY DENIK. They claimed that strains of bacteria and viruses intended for use as the basis for biological weapons are being stored (or concealed) in our military facilities.

If we summarize the statements made by the ministerial and army top brass, this is what we get: Bacteriological and virological weapons were never developed in our secret military facilities, and not at all for the purposes of the Warsaw Pact. The institute in Techonin never took part in such activity; the scientists in its laboratories only worked on immunological research. According to Ales Macela, the current vice president of the Military Medical Academy and a leading research worker at the Techonin institute, there were no technical conditions in his institute for achieving genetic changes in individual strains. The two batches of strains of bacteria and viruses—the one in Techonin and the one that was kept in the building leased to the Klinlab (Clinical Laboratories) limited company in the Central Military Hospital in Stresovice—were simply harmless batches prepared in case the state was involved in a defense emergency. Moreover, 80 percent of them were common viruses and a mere 20 percent were exotic viruses. Summa summarum: By storing the aforementioned strains, the army in no way violated the international convention on prohibiting the use, development, and accumulation of biological weapons. The interdepartmental commission, whose establishment was initiated by Baudys, decided that it was no longer necessary to keep

the strains and, therefore, the viral banks were destroyed. Absolutely nothing happened—irresponsible journalists from CESKY DENIK just want to injure our army.

In considering whether it is CESKY DENIK or the gentlemen from the Defense Ministry and the army who are telling fairy tales, it is enough to recall some of the facts confirmed by Minister Baudys himself and Chief of the General Staff Nekvasil: On 13 February, in connection with the personnel changes in the military health service department, Baudys finds out for the first time about the existence of batches of strains. An investigation follows, and on 17 February an interdepartmental commission is set up on Baudys' initiative. The swift destruction of the first batch in Stresovice begins during the next seven days. The defense minister personally orders the destruction. The chief of the General Staff also gives his personal guarantee that the destruction was carried out safely and that there was no risk. On 9 March the ministerial and army top brass receive the news that there is another batch of strains in Techonin in East Bohemia. Another swift destruction follows.

Other facts, not mentioned by Baudys, speak plainly. The whole affair has been investigated since the beginning by officers from Military Defense Intelligence (VOZ), who were present at the destruction along with the Military Police. VOZ is also taking care of the Techonin research documentation; of course, on Friday Ales Macela claimed that it is still stored in Techonin. The Defense Ministry is handing over part of the case to the Security and Information Service. What on earth for? After all, only allegedly "common and no longer necessary" strains were destroyed!

There were several ways Minister Baudys could have acted before Friday. One of these was telling the truth. He could have said that genetically altered viruses and bacteria developed for use as biological weapons had been concealed without his knowledge. He could have admitted that they are still—in all probability—"stored" in other, so far unknown, places. He chose another course of action, and thus associated himself with the people who had developed and concealed these materials. Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Jiri Payne declared yesterday that the whole incident has to be thoroughly investigated. It only remains for me to add that, if CESKY DENIK has not reported the truth, the authors of the articles are, according to the law, criminally liable. They could, for example, have committed the crime of spreading alarming reports. If the defense minister is familiar with the criminal law, then he knows that he is required to submit a complaint. He will probably not do so, however, and he knows why. The ministerial fairy tales would not be enough to obtain a conviction in a law-governed state.

### Army Involvement Questioned

AU2403181194 Prague CESHY DENIK in Czech  
23 Mar 94 p 3

[Jan Benes commentary: "About Deputy Minister Kalousek's 'Expedient Lie'"]

[Text] In the course of an extraordinary news conference called by the defense minister to calm down the public, Deputy Defense Minister Kalousek described the CESHY DENIK information about contributing to Klinlab equipment with Army supplies as an expedient lie. The deputy minister is apparently well-versed in the field so he knew what he was talking about. What he said was an expedient untruth.

This time around, we will not devote our attention to the problem of biological warfare agents (for, at this time, the explanation of the difference between an offensive and defensive cholera is beyond our ability).

We will leave that for some other time, including the military laboratories in Olesnice, as well as the equipment for the reproduction of viruses, with which the Techonin Research Institute was equipped despite the claims made by the Defense Ministry officials calming down the public. After all, it was from here that the Bulgarian, Romanian, GDR, and Russian experts—who used to work here—withdrew their research and documentation.

So, that is one group of expedient untruths. Let us, however, devote ourselves to the Klinlab Co., a company that operates in the building of the Military Hospital in [Prague-]Stresovice. It was precisely in the facility leased to Klinlab that the bank of "completely common viruses" was located that was destroyed on Defense Minister Baudys' order under extraordinary security measures.

First, already in 1992, expensive foreign-made equipment was bought for the Central Military Health Institution—a laboratory glass washer, for instance, or an automatic analyzer—just to guarantee a good future for the Central Military Hospital [UVN]. The purchases were made by the deputy chief of the Central Military Health Institution (UVZU), Dr. Moravek. The justification was that the UVZU would produce and market hygienically pure water for commercial purposes. Shortly thereafter, however, a questionnaire was circulated among the employees of this institution recruiting "experts" for the future private laboratory institute called Klinlab. The questionnaire was then used to justify (the people want it) the establishment of Klinlab. This company assumed, however, only the profit-making or profit promising part of the UVZU. Under the auspices of Economics Deputy Minister Kalousek, the company was authorized to manage the six-floor facility in the UVN by a contract dated 10 September 1993 and signed with the Army for Klinlab by no one else but Dr. Moravek, still an officer on

active duty. He signed as the executive secretary of a company that had not yet been founded, much less registered.

This violates a good number of laws and regulations—including the defense minister's order No. 9 of 11 February 1993.

Only a month after the signing of the lease (which leaves the owner with the obligations of the owner, including construction alterations), on 11 October 1993, the Klinlab company contract was signed, and only on 23 October 1993 is Klinlab entered on the company register.

In a state governed by rule of law, the contract would certainly be invalid. In a state governed by rule of law, the people signing such contracts would be considered cheats. Furthermore, Dr. Moravek and all the other officers from the Klinlab Ltd. who signed the contract brazenly violated Law 143/1992 in its Article 3, Section 4 of the government instruction, according to which they are paid their salary with a 25 percent bonus provided they do not engage in business but only serve in the Army!

The Klinlab lease contract (let us assume that the same ministerial office is responsible for its organization, which refused other privatization projects, including one from Canada) rents the relevant part of the UVN for 720,123 korunas annually to the, of course, not yet existing legal entity, and the money was then lent to them interest-free for a fixed term, i.e., until the purchase contract is signed. All that happens on 1 December 1993. Material and supplies worth dozens of millions is passed onto Klinlab without inventory, and when an inventory is taken of the furniture and equipment, it is calculated at write-off prices. Regarding the laboratory equipment valued at approximately 30 million korunas, then, Klinlab chooses what it needs and purchases (until the date of the purchase contract it will use it free of charge) the equipment at a later date.

So, this is the expedient lie about Engineer Kalousek of which we are guilty.

The military equipment that was profitable for the Army, including the equipment purchased for taxpayer's money, will pass into private hands. The money-losing equipment will be kept by the Army.

Of course, some soldiers wanted to object. That was an ill-advised idea. After all, the appropriate commission investigated it. Even Colonel Krizenecky put his iron in the fire, and so did Military Prosecutor Dr. Novak. The same one who was investigating but never concluded the investigation of the activities of another man of the Kalousek-type at the Defense Ministry, the current director of the Nase Vojsko [Our Army] publishing house, Jakub Cisar—of course, that was still in the Orbis publishing house.

We will reach the stage of socialism in our country, we will be successful in defending the peace, and we will thwart the iniquitous activities of traitors, and so on along the arduous path towards a better tomorrow. The officers will get paid (by us, friends) for not

engaging in business. They conduct business (with our money). Are we to believe that the sale of microbes, eventually to be thrown into a synagogue as an example, presents a problem for such enterprising entrepreneurs?



## BRAZIL

### Admiral Flores Wants Nuclear Program Open to Private Sector

PY1903202394 Sao Paulo ISTOE in Portuguese  
16 Mar 94 p 25

[Article by Mario Chimanovitch]

[Text] The use of nuclear energy is by its nature a controversial issue. It becomes still more controversial when the discussion is about whether the government or the private sector should be in charge of nuclear activities. A document drafted by the Strategic Affairs Secretariat (SAE), to which this magazine had access, has added fuel to the atomic bonfire. SAE Memo No. 109, dated 11 February and signed by SAE head Admiral Mario Cesar Flores, favors the privatization of certain stages of the nuclear process and opposes the position traditionally defended by the Brazilian military of maintaining absolute government monopoly over the field. The document, which was handed to the SAE under secretary for plans and programs, was drafted to guide governmental action in the constitutional revision. It states: "There is no reason why private concessionaires should not be in charge of mining work, concentrates manufacturing, trade, and many other related activities. The same applies to electrical energy production."

Adm. Flores believes that one of the activities that could be performed by the private sector is nuclear fuel production. In his opinion, the government should only control the most sensitive sectors such as uranium enrichment. Private companies could, for example, participate in uranium mining or import certain components for the final fuel. He points out, however, that the National Nuclear Energy Commission [CNEN], i.e. the government, must preserve "its regulatory, supervisory, and licensing" role. He also suggests that the civilian sector should accompany nuclear activities through the establishment—by the national Congress—of a joint committee. This suggestion is in accordance with another bill proposed by Flores to reorganize the intelligence service, which also would be closely followed by a joint committee established by Congress.

Several countries such as the United States and France have adopted the policy of partially privatizing nuclear projects. Nonetheless, many still criticize Flores' proposal. Professor Bernardino Pontes, who acted as surveyor of the Vienna-headquartered International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for 12 years, said: "The so-called nuclear fuel cycle must remain in Brazilian hands to protect it from international oligopolies." Pontes agrees nonetheless that private enterprises can be more effective in mining. He insists, however, that they should work under CNEN control "because there is a great deal of international greed now that Brazil is

beginning to stand out in the extremely select club of countries that have nuclear technology."

In the opinion of Everton Carvalho, vice president of the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Association (Aben), Flores' proposal makes Brazil vulnerable. "The most serious thing is that the end of the monopoly would make it easy for foreign groups to accurately design a chart of our reserves," he said. It is believed that Brazilian uranium reserves total 280,000 metric tons.

Former CNEN President Rex Nazareth, who is a colonel and an engineer, believes the private sector's resources might contribute to reducing Brazilian backwardness in the nuclear field.

Another expert, Brigadier Sergio Xavier Ferolla—who has been director of the Sao Jose dos Campos Aerospace Technical Center and is now commander of the Superior War College—believes the government should give up only its monopoly over uranium exploitation. He includes the nuclear field among those that have "a highly strategic role and should therefore remain under government control on behalf of Brazilian sovereignty and society's interests."

In the eye of the storm, Adm. Flores remains calm and asserts that most of the controversy results from a "misunderstanding." Be as it may, the situation will become hotter this year because Brazil's strategic interests in the nuclear field will be analyzed by the Superior War College. This makes us forecast a new—and more serious—confrontation among those who defend and those who oppose absolute governmental monopoly over the nuclear field.

## PARAGUAY

### Union Reports Illegal Entry of Radioactive Material

PY2203172394 Asuncion ULTIMA HORA in Spanish  
20 Mar 94 pp 14-15

[Excerpt] Leaders of the Employees and Workers Union of the National Directorate for Civilian Aviation (SEODINAC) have expressed concern because no attention has yet been given to several reports of irregularities submitted to the Administrative Council of the DINAC [National Directorate for Civilian Aviation].

The union said: "We are facing a worrisome situation over the entry of 104 kg of radioactive material under the UN Development Program through the Silvio Pettirossi International Airport."

The union added that the situation is worse because the highly dangerous cargo left the airport jurisdiction under a regulation called "cargo to be regularized" which can be considered legalized smuggling.

The union commented that approximately 18 months ago two small cans of radioactive material were found at the airport. The case was made public but nobody knew anything about how they appeared.

The union stated: "Documents now in our possession open the way to a thorough investigation that could expose a new face in the trafficking of prohibited merchandise through our airport."

The union believes several people are responsible for the entry of nuclear material into the country: One is Colonel Ramon Dardo Guerra, head of the DINAC; Another is Colonel Americo Osorio, airport director, who authorized the delivery without even the payment of the airport duties, and Victor Arevalo as the professional who mediated in this shipment. The air cargo ramp chief is also believed to be involved. [passage omitted]

## INDIA

### Paper Notes U.S. Tilt Toward Pakistan

BK2003071894 *Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES in Hindi*  
12 Mar 94 p 4

[Editorial: "Prime Minister's Firm Stand"]

[Text] If U.S. Senator Larry Pressler is quoting Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao correctly and if the prime minister is not refuting his claims, then Rao's assertions on defense policy can be described as the most important statement of his term—the most important because the statement is directly related to India's nuclear policy. Since the prime minister has explained his viewpoint to Pressler and spoken on the controversy currently raging in the United States on the Pressler Amendment, there can be no other meaning to his alleged statement. After assuming the reins of power, the Clinton administration has tilted so much toward Pakistan that the President—restless to resume military aid to Pakistan—considers the Pressler Amendment as a thorn in his way. The amendment provides that Pakistan will not be eligible to receive U.S. military aid unless and until the U.S. President certifies that Islamabad is not pursuing its program to manufacture an atom bomb. It was on this very ground that the former President George Bush had stopped military aid to Pakistan. It will now be difficult for Clinton to certify, contrary to his predecessor's decision, that Pakistan is not pursuing a nuclear bomb program. In the meantime, contrary to the above, many facts have come to light that dispel any doubts about Pakistan's ability and intention to manufacture a nuclear bomb. Meanwhile, the Lockheed company is increasing pressure on President Clinton to allow the supply of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan. This proves that, after failing in its bid to repeal the Pressler Amendment, the Clinton administration has now thought of formulating the policy of a one-time waiver of the Pressler Amendment to allow the supply of F-16 planes to Pakistan and later making the amendment operative again.

It is apparent that with the help of this policy, a sheer humbuggery, the Clinton administration wants to make Pakistan stronger than India by getting rid of the Pressler Amendment, which will only result in the revival of the arms race in the Indian Subcontinent. The policy also tacitly encourages Pakistan to manufacture an atom bomb. India has thus far adopted the policy of not making any nuclear weapon. In spite of this, India has not yet signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] because it thinks NPT is unfair to the nonnuclear states. However, if the United States chooses to patronize Islamabad's nuclear policy on the pretext of supplying F-16 aircraft to Pakistan, then India will be forced to review its nuclear options, and this is the very meaning of Prime Minister Rao's alleged statement. If read in the context of our government's disinterestedness in Raphael's planned visit to

India, the home minister's two warnings to the United States in parliament, and the successful role played by the Indian delegation at Geneva, one can derive the message that India's future attitude toward the U.S. can be firm and admonitory. Anything contrary will depend solely on the U.S. behavior.

### Commentary Rejects 'One-Time' Pressler Amendment Waiver

BK2103093794 *Delhi All India Radio Network in English*  
0245 GMT 21 Mar 94

[Commentary by Defense Analyst Udhay Bhaskar Reddy]

[Text] The report in the prestigious LOS ANGELES TIMES, better known as L.A. TIMES, that Pakistan has managed to build six to 12 Hiroshima-type bombs as part of its clandestine nuclear weapons program is significant for two reasons. In the first instance, it is not the number of bombs that Pakistan has stashed away in the basement that is germane. The United States was aware as early as in 1987 that Pakistan was embarked upon a determined clandestine nuclear weapons program and had accurate estimates about how much fissile grade material Islamabad had stockpiled. However, Washington preferred to pretend that it did not know as part of the Cold War charade.

What the L.A. TIMES story does is to draw attention to the many promises and pledges broken by Pakistan in its dealings with the United States over military aid to its clandestine nuclear weapons program. This is the first important inference, namely that in the past, whether it was in 1981 or 1985, the supply of lethal modern military gadgetry by the United States has not deflected Pakistan from its single-minded pursuit of a covert nuclear weapons program. That a respected U.S. daily is saying this may be reflective of the growing public disenchantment within the United States over proliferation perplexities. The second significant aspect is the inside the L.A. TIMES story provides into the deep divisions within the U.S. establishment over the Pressler Amendment and its interpretation. As the report points out, many senior-most officials in the Clinton Administration appear to be keen to condone Pakistan's nuclear quest under ardent advocates of waiving the amendment. However, there are more perceptive and informed voices, including that of Senator Larry Pressler, who are seized with the enormity of this seemingly casual one-time waiver. It does appear that the Clinton team is deluding itself that a one-time waiver of the Pressler Amendment would induce Pakistan to cap its nuclear weapons program and that the proliferation problem in the region will then be resolved. Nothing could be further from the truth. Whether Pakistan has one bomb in the basement or 12, this is a level at which the United States hopes it will capped. But, as the North Korean and Iraqi examples have shown, clandestine nuclear programs do not lend themselves to satisfactory



external monitoring, and in any case this capping will not assuage India's anxieties over a bomb in the neighboring basement where even the elected prime minister is not allowed to visit the nuclear facility, let alone control it.

### **Air Defence Weakness May Make Nuclear Deterrence Vital**

*BK2303141094 Delhi INDIAN EXPRESS in English  
17 March 94 p 9*

[Text] New Delhi—India may have little option but to turn towards nuclear-based deterrence if United States goes ahead with its proposal to supply arms to Pakistan, according to defence experts here.

India, given its precariously placed economy and an indulgent "Soviet Union" that has disappeared, is in no position to buy frontline fighter planes, maritime patrol aircraft, and state-of-the-art electronic warfare systems which Pakistan gets, in case the Pressler amendment is waived.

With the balance of power already in favour of Pakistan, thanks to the cutback on Indian defence spending, a fresh supply of 71 F-16s, three harpoon-armed P-3 maritime aircraft, radars and electronic warfare systems and main battle tanks will completely load the dice against India.

Arguing that to merely correct this balance, India would have to step up its defence spending to 4 per cent of the gross domestic product from the existing level of 2.4 per cent within a year, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, director of Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses says, "the alternative cheaper option may be to move towards defence-based nuclear deterrence".

As it exists now, India cannot conceivably set aside 4 per cent of the GDP on defence expenditure, without seriously jeopardising its economic reforms.

Even under the US arms embargo following Pressler amendment in 1990, Pakistan has quadrupled its combat capabilities procuring fighters from Australia, China.

The contrast between the air forces of India and Pakistan is striking. Since eighties when the IAF [Indian Air Force] inducted 45-odd Mirage in answer to Pakistan's F-16's, it has added on 35 Mig-27's manufactured at the HAL plant in Nasik.

Pakistan Air Force since 1990 has inducted 145 combat aircraft (50 Mirage and 95 F-7Ps from China). Another 40 F-7P's are due to join the force later this year.

From Italy, it is due to pick up 100 GRIFO sophisticated look-up and look-down radars mounted on the F-7P's.

While India drags its feet over the advanced jet trainer, PAF (Pakistan Air Force) has started to receive K-8 jet trainers and light tactical aircraft from China. The nuclear-capable M-11 ballistic missile supplied by China has been deployed in the Pakistan air arm.

With the proposed supply of 71 F-16's including 40-odd ready for immediate delivery, the "balance of power substantially swings towards Pakistan" a defence expert points out.

Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao who has warned that he would review the defence policy in case the Pressler amendment is waived for Pakistan is understood to have asked the research establishment to speed up the light combat aircraft [LCA] project.

The LCA scheduled to roll out by June 1996, on paper, is the country's answer to the F-16. Simultaneously, IAF has been asked to look at ways to upgrade the sophisticated Mirage 2000 which was finally bought in answer to the first batch of F-16s obtained by Pakistan.

The French manufacturers of the fighter aircraft are likely to be asked to upgrade the avionics.

The implications of waiving the Pressler amendment are understood to have figured high in the meeting of the Indo-U.S. Air Force steering committee that began here on Monday.

The American delegation led by Lt. General John S. Fairfield, Vice Commander U.S. Pacific Air Force called on Air Chief S. K. Kaul.

"Matters of mutual interest" were discussed, a Defence Ministry release said.

IAF vice chief P. J. Jaykumar led the Indian side in the steering committee deliberations aimed at enhancing service-to-service cooperation. The first meeting of the committee took place in Hawaii in August 1993.

The security scenario in South-East Asia is expected to be discussed at length in the three-day deliberations of the steering committee. Officers from training, maintenance, intelligence are taking part in the deliberations.

## **IRAQ**

### **Foreign Minister's TV Statement on UN Resolutions**

*JN1603083194 Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic  
16 May 94 p 2*

[Report on Iraqi Foreign Minister Muhammad Sa'id al-Shahhaf's Statement on Iraqi Television on 15 March 1994; "al-Shahhaf: Resolution 706 Contains Traps and Snares To Shackle Iraq and To Continue Imposing the Blockade; There Is a Treacherous Game in Applying the Resolution Aimed at Avoiding Fulfillment of Obligations"]

[Excerpts] Iraqi Television last night carried an interview with Foreign Minister Muhammad Sa'id al-Shahhaf in which he reviewed the provisions of the resolutions that were issued the UN Security Council, Iraq's positions on them, and the lack of any justifications for these resolutions now that Iraq has fulfilled its obligations.

The Minister remarked that this subject needs to be explained and clarified in detail in view of the conspiracies and intrigue that the enemies of Iraq and Arabdom have woven around it. [passage omitted]

The minister said: The key point of Resolution (687), to which the leader president referred in his speech, is Section (C). This section includes Paragraphs (7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13). Paragraph (14) is an explanation saying if Paragraphs 7-13 are applied successfully to Iraq, it would be the beginning of their application to the entire Middle East to turn it into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. They have not yet done anything on this score.

The minister said: Regarding Section (C), which includes the paragraphs I just mentioned, they said: We know that you Iraqis have weapons of mass destruction. These weapons exist in the following fields: the nuclear field, the chemical field, the biological field, and the delivery systems field; that is missiles. They also said: We have Paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 to apply and we will set up a UN Special Commission for that. There is also the International Agency for Atomic Energy, which specializes in these matters. The Special Commission and the agency have been instructed to work out a plan with you. You will tell them the weapons and missiles you have. Teams from the Special Commission and the agency will come to inspect them, and the existing arsenal will be destroyed. We will inspect the sites where you manufactured and installed the machines and plants which produce these weapons. We will remove parts of these machines so that they would no longer be able to produce chemical weapons or missiles with a range of more than 150 km.

The minister added: They wanted us to reveal all that we had and to destroy it. They wanted us to destroy the weapons, which were banned under the provisions of this resolution, and also the machines and factories connected with their production. Once these steps were taken, Iraq would have nothing left and would be in no position to produce anything.

The minister said: They said: But in order to make sure that you Iraqis—and we know you are a clever and dynamic people—will not go back to producing these weapons, we will set up a future monitoring system. They mentioned in Section (C) of Resolution (687) that the monitoring system would last for one year.

The minister said: Since they accepted the resolution, one would presume that based their acceptance on the principles of law, international relations, and the UN

Charter, meaning, first, that whatever they requested under Section (C) would not prejudice Iraq's national sovereignty and independence, its ability for development, and its right to self-determination, which are basic for any society and country. We presumed that our dealing began on the basis of the provisions and principles I mentioned.

The minister added: We have been following Section (C) since the cease-fire in 1991. The leader president said: Tell us what you want so we can sit together, discuss it, and destroy some machines and plants to make them unserviceable. And in order to reassure everyone we will also set up a monitoring system. This has been going on since 1991. We did more than we promised. For the sake of precision and to prove to our people, I will mention some of the documents which we deposited with the United Nations and which are now considered documents of the Security Council. They asked us to begin with the nuclear field first, and we did. They said we want Iraq to announce its commitment to the Nonproliferation Treaty, we said: Fine, we have the following: six letters which were sent by the foreign minister containing Iraq's adherence to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 16 messages and statements confirming that Iraq does not possess nuclear weapons and that it does not produce these weapons or any substance that goes into their production, 62 letters containing Iraqi declarations on nuclear positions, and 23 nuclear teams. Then they said: Tell us about the components of the Iraqi nuclear program. We told them what we had: 547 tonnes of natural uranium [yuraniyum tabi'i] and 50 kgs of highly enriched fuel. They took them and transported them outside Iraq. We said also that we had 1,850 kgs of a fairly enriched uranium, 6 kgs of plutonium for scientific research, and 6 tonnes of uranium waste. That was all.

They carried out a thorough inspection. Then, they said: We want to know the stages of your nuclear program. So, we told them that our stages are as follows: Extraction of uranium from ore and its transformation into uranium compounds. We have electromagnetics, chemicals, and central [word indistinct]. All this is for research. We also process fuels. This framework, as you can see, is very normal. We have nuclear reactors we bought from you. We have an electro-nuclear power project, plants to retrieve depleted (wasted) nuclear fuel, and a plant for the treatment of radioactive waste. We have scientific research efforts that are connected to the program. Our position is the same as that of any other nation or state that is conducting research. It is all scientific research for use in medicine and agriculture, as part of the development programs. Finally, we have agricultural and medical applications, to which we have already referred. Of course, we have a nuclear safety system, nuclear safety measures, and the engineering support for them.

The minister said: They saw and thoroughly inspected what we had. Talks with [UN chief inspector] Ekeus

began in July 1993. They continued in September, October, and November of that year, and in New York, as well. In his capacity as the representative of the International Agency for Atomic Energy, he wrote—we have the document because it is a now Security Council document—saying: There are no more secrets in the Iraqi program. Iraq has approved Resolution 715 concerning permanent monitoring. We believe Iraq has fulfilled all its obligations.

The minister said: Regarding the chemical field, we followed the same line. We told them what we have. I will mention some figures, because we have them in our records and they are also documented with the Security Council.

The minister continued: Some 12 large chemical inspection teams came, under Paragraph 9 of Section C, to see the records, visit the sites, and obtain samples. We detailed our stockpile: 10,780 pieces of missile hardware [ʿatad sawarikh] for 122-mm missiles, 1,776 shells [qanbarah], 12,634 artillery shells, 30 al-Husayn missile warheads and 2,000 mortar shells. We said you can visit the sites where this hardware is produced, and the development laboratories, as well. They inspected them. Then they asked: Where are the simple materials [al-mawad al-basitah]? We told them that the stockpile of active materials [al-mawad al-ʿawamil] is 280 tonnes, and the simple materials stockpile is 75 tonnes. They asked to see the canisters. We told them here are 45,000 canisters for 122-mm missiles and 5,000 shells for 250-mm missiles, and here are the 24,000 that were destroyed in the bombing. They were all destroyed in the bombing. They saw it all, including the scrap metal. Then, they began inspecting. Later, they said: We want to see the documents.

The minister added: We gave them the nuclear documents, which totaled more than 60,000 pages. Then they asked for the documents on chemical weapons. We told them they were destroyed in the bombing. Then they told us: We want you to remember everything and write it down on paper. Iraqi experts exerted great efforts and wrote down everything in order to eliminate any excuse. Ekeus wrote on a piece of paper: I find this to be satisfactory, meeting all requirements. Ekeus then heard the statements by the official in charge of the Iraqi and Gulf Section in the U.S. State Department and by the U.S. National Security Council adviser. He became suspicious after hearing these statements, although we had a signed document between us in which he said that what he saw was satisfactory and met all requirements.

When he heard those people speaking in this way, he decided that he wanted more information and that what we had given him was not enough. Some 12 large chemical teams came. They left nothing unearthed. They analyzed water and soil. They carried out air inspections. They were very provocative, but the Iraqis restrained themselves and remained very patient. The behavior of the others was really bad and provocative.

The minister said: Iraq did not have anything in the biological field. Actually, what we had was just scientific research. We did not have any secrets. The so-called reinforced microbes [mikrubat mujahadah] were purchased from the United States for purely scientific research, not for biochemical weapons. Several experts came and saw them. Then they said: We want to see the laboratories, even in those in Iraqi universities. They also asked if there were any private sector laboratories.

Regarding the missiles, we told them: This is what we have. Here are the al-Husayn missiles. Here are the Scuds we got from the Russians. We gave them details. During this period, they brought in 21 teams, if not more, consisting of missile specialists.

The minister said: The United States continued to play the same tune, i.e., that Iraq hid some missiles. So, they launched a new search campaign. I call it a search campaign, not an inspection campaign. They brought in helicopters and gamma ray spectrometers to discover what Iraq might have hidden underground. They then toured the country. They stayed for several weeks. The American lie was exposed.

The minister added: Finally, they asked for the records about the disposal of missiles. We gave them the records. Then they said: We want to see if these documents are original or recent. They brought in a team to inspect the documents. Then they said: The documents are original, but we will take them to Europe for further inspection by more sensitive instruments, although we are sure they are original. We will take them to inspect them. We patiently said: Take them. Then we said: Fine, we have covered all fields under Paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Section C. Nothing has been left uninspected.

I will now mention how far they have gone in their behavior. They said: We want to go to the southern marshlands, because we received information about possible leftover chemical weapons that were used there. We said: This is very ridiculous. They said: Still, we must go. We took them to the south. They wore protective suits against chemical weapons. They were flat on the ground while helicopters hovered over their heads. They located an object stuck into ground. They walked over cautiously, tied a rope round it, fearing it might explode. When they pulled it out it turned out to be used mortar shell. I still remember how some of them shook their heads shamefully, and others said: These people—meaning the Americans—are making a mockery of us.

The minister said: We knew right from the start that it was an intentional thing. This was one of hundreds, if not thousands, of examples that Iraqis have patiently endured since 1991.

The minister added: You may not have heard some of the remarks made about the Ministry of Agriculture, which turned out to be theatrical, since they did not



find any of the things they claimed were inside the Ministry. Actually, there was nothing in the Ministry. But since they had nothing to say, they wrote in their report: We found in one of the rooms "a scratch" on a wall caused by a chair. Apparently, the employee using this particular chair placed it against the wall, causing the scratch. They said in the report: We saw the chair but its back was not as high as the scratch. So, it was not the chair that caused scratch. This means the chair that made the scratch was replaced. They included that in the report as evidence. The report was referred to the UN Security Council. You know how tense relations were with the Security Council, which wanted any justification in order to deceive the world about the aggressive threats being made by peoples' hangmen.

The minister said: As you can see, I am only citing examples and completely avoiding any personal comment. I dealt with this person, Ekeus, right from the start. I recall that during our meeting together during his last visit here in February 1994, we asked him certain specific questions. I asked him: Why this delay? What more is asked of us? We explained what we have. You also know what we destroyed. I also gave you figures. Then they said they wanted whatever we mentioned in writing. They said: Actually, we saw the destroyed ammunition, and the picture you presented to us was clear, but please remember everything and put it down in writing. They wanted us to sit down, remember everything, and commit it to writing. We had to think and remember what happened in a certain month or a certain year, what empty shell, magazine, or simple weapon was used, and for what purpose.

The minister said: Iraqi technicians sat down and very patiently searched their brains so as to eliminate any excuse. They produced a full record for Ekeus. He was astonished by the results. He said: What you have written down from memory is sufficient and meets the purpose. We recorded it in our joint minutes. But the Western henchmen said it was not enough. We could not accept their haphazard remarks. We told Ekeus: Sit down. You said the record was sufficient and met the purpose. Therefore, this change in attitude is politically motivated in order to prolong the blockade of Iraq. Some Western henchmen say this is not enough. To be honest, most members in the Security Council are against the extension of the blockade on Iraq, because they have begun to see the irrefutable facts. But the Americans are known for influencing and blackmailing others, and Ekeus knows that. During the last meeting in February regarding the monitoring, Gart [name as transliterated] produced a chart and reminded me of Resolution 706, which provides for exporting oil worth \$1.6 billion. The world knows only that oil is to be exported. But it does not know the traps and snares inherent in this resolution designed to shackle Iraq. All these traps and snares are actually intended to make us approve the monitoring system details.

The minister said: Fine, you have worked out everything. Ekeus said: Well, I cannot say that. I said: Fine, why don't you find out? You have the Special Commission and the experience. You have used everything, including espionage aircraft. And now you say you do not know anything. How can that be? He said: We do not have the capability. I said: Fine, when the Americans wanted to support Iranian claims that Iraq used chemical weapons in the Gulf, you made a big uproar. A working team was immediately dispatched to the south. Fine, let us talk about monitoring. Iraq and its people have been very patient with you since 1991. Yet, you now say that you do not have the capability. This is unacceptable. We ask you, in fact, it is our right—or, to be more precise, it is our minimum right—to work out a timetable to apply to what remains, if you have something new to be monitored. Practically speaking, the monitoring began in December 1993, it is in progress, and the inspection cameras have been mounted at missile sites and nuclear establishments. The inspection teams also continue to operate in the factories. They even marked some machines with tape, saying they must not be used. Ekeus came to us saying: There are machines in some factories that must not be used until the monitoring system has been installed. So, he produced some tape and stuck it on the machines, although they are ordinary commercial machines that the Iraqi could have used for months. Tape was stuck on machines, cameras were installed in two places, to inspect missile engines and in the nuclear sector. Iraqi laboratories are under inspection and all the monitoring measures have been taken, yet Ekeus comes and says: But our capabilities are limited. This is an obvious lie. Its purpose is to waste time and to continue the blockade of the Iraqi people. We told Ekeus in February: This is our minimum right. We have been patient with you until now.

The minister said: We said let us work out a timetable. He evaded the subject. We pressed him. We held three meetings that continued for hours. But he prevaricated like a fox in the forest, as the leader president said. He said: We must have a protocol, or a record, for each factory specifying the type of monitoring being conducted in it. We should also set up logs. Although this was completely unacceptable, we told him: Let it be, although we are not 100-percent convinced that you have the capability. We know what your capabilities are. We know what the Americans have placed at your disposal. We ask you: How many Iraqi engineers and experts do you want? Two hundred? Take 200. They will help you accomplish your work quickly, according to this timetable. As far as we are concerned, we believe monitoring began in December 1993. Ekeus said: If I agreed to that, they would say I was cooperating with the Iraqis. What a weak excuse! So, he completely avoided committing himself to a timetable, which is our minimum right. [passage omitted]

**ISRAEL****Allegations of 'Secret' Contacts With DPRK on Missiles to Iran****Radio Broadcasts Report**

TA2203074794 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew  
0600 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] Israel is holding secret contacts with North Korea in a bid to prevent it from supplying Iran with long-range missiles. These contacts are being held against the wishes of the United States and contrary to Israel's promise to coordinate its relations with North Korea with the United States. Our political correspondent Udi Segal reports:

Several weeks ago, Israeli diplomats met with senior North Korean representatives in Beijing in the framework of secret contacts between the two countries. The contacts are designed to secure an agreement that would prevent North Korea from supplying Iran with Nodong missiles. These missiles, which have a range of 1,000 km, can carry chemical and nuclear warheads. In exchange, Israel is proposing to help raise approximately \$1 billion among American Jewish businessmen for civilian projects in North Korea.

The contacts between the two countries are mainly coordinated by the Israeli Embassy in Beijing. The secret talks are being held against the wishes of the United States, which is currently conducting a campaign against North Korea in view of the latter's refusal to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The Israeli-North Korean connection started approximately two years ago. One of the main mediators is an American Jewish businessman whose identity is being kept secret for fear that the U.S. authorities will harass him. Following preliminary contacts, Eytan Bentzur, deputy director general of the Foreign Ministry, left for North Korea among a group of geologists. Once there, he held secret meetings with North Korean officials. Bentzur prepared a visit by Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres to North Korea, but at that point the United States intervened. Secretary of State Warren Christopher met with Peres in Vienna and protested Israel's contacts with North Korea. Peres promised that all future contacts would be coordinated with the United States.

A senior political source in Jerusalem said the present contacts between Israel and North Korea are not necessarily being coordinated with the United States. We are dealing here with an Israeli security interest, and if we do not take care of it, nobody else will do it for us, the source claims.

**Foreign Ministry Denies Contacts**

TA2203093894 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew  
0930 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] The Foreign Ministry spokesman this morning denied the report on IDF Radio and in HA'ARETZ according to which Israel and North Korea are conducting secret contacts. The Foreign Ministry says that the contacts between the two countries were stopped in the wake of a decision by the prime minister and foreign minister. Our political correspondent Udi Segal reports, however, that political sources in Jerusalem confirmed the report that contacts were held between the two countries in a bid to prevent North Korea from supplying Iran with long-range Nodong missiles.

**PAKISTAN****Country's Security Situation Viewed**

BK1903110894 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
19 Mar 94 p 7

[Report by Syed Alamdar Raza: "Pakistan's External Security Environment"]

[Text] The meeting of the Defence Coordination of the Cabinet (DCC) was held on 10th March which, according to newspaper reports, discussed the latest situation obtaining in occupied Kashmir, attitude of different countries in respect of the Kashmir issue, situation of Siachin and other border needs of the Armed Forces specially the matter of the F-16, Pak American relations and matters related to the purchase of the Armed Forces equipment from different countries. The meeting was held in the context of the reports that the Indian defence budget had gone up by 20 percent i. e. from Rs [rupees] 191.8 billion to Rs 230 billion. The ground situation also has vastly changed and India has now a clear 2 to 1 superiority over Pakistan.

Their state of weaponry is vastly better than that of Pakistan because of their huge indigenisation programme resulting in ready and easy replacements of the old, used up and outdated weaponry and spares. Pakistan's support even in respect of the Kashmir issue is not what it should have been i. e. the two resolutions presented before the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Commission on human rights violations, had to be withdrawn and deferred. Even the purchased and paid for military equipment in USA has not been made available with the result that military initiatives has passed on to India. The relaxation of Sino-Indian relationship has enabled India to withdraw two more divisions and concentrate against Pakistan. The security environment has, therefore greatly deteriorated.

Indian writers are now confident that Pakistan is no longer a military problem in terms of conventional

warfare. Ravi Rikhy in his book "The war that never was" has the following remark to make, "Trident (name of a defence exercise) called for an attack on 8th February 1987 at 0430 hours with Skardu as the first objective and Gilgit as the second. The operation was expected to last two weeks, within which time the Northern Areas under Pakistani occupation since 1947-48 would be recovered. If Pakistan chose to keep the conflict limited to Northern Areas, this was fine with India.

But suppose Pakistan wanted to retaliate and escalate by attacking Punjab, then "Brass Tacks" which was originally planned as a gigantic strategic deception to focus Pakistan's attention on Sindh while we went for Northern Areas, would have been converted into an actual operation with the aim of reaching Muzaffargarh within three days and Hyderabad City within seven". India has been keeping such contingency plans ready ever since and is in a position to launch them as and when it suited her. Her superiority in numbers and equipment makes it clear that she is quite capable of launching such operations. India may have wrong notions about our defence capabilities and her claim to run over may not be quite as easy as she imagines but what is quite clear is that India is now clearly in a position to take initiatives as and when she likes and we have only the option to react effectively to what India does. This possibility makes us highly vulnerable.

What has kept India away from launching such adventures is the fact that according to her, Pakistan has developed the nuclear capacity. Even here India claims 1 to 10 superiority over Pakistan but Pakistan's ability to launch nuclear retaliation according to India is such that she is capable of destroying New Delhi and Tarapur causing immense destruction and crippling India to such an extent that she would be effectively neutralised for years to come. The fact that Pakistan will also be extensively destroyed, is hardly a matter of any satisfaction and will hardly provide India any edge over her. What is worse from India's point of view is that in this respect Pakistan has the initiative and can launch a nuclear retaliation at her will. In fact, it should be a normal expectation that if operations like Trident or Brass Tacks were launched and Pakistan was squeezed as Indians hoped she would be, she would resort to nuclear warfare and being a weaker nation, may be the first to use it out of insecurity.

This is a very real possibility of which the Indian Magazine "India Today" dated 15th February 1994, has referred to. There are three aspects of the nuclear problem which are causing great worry to India. Firstly, that Pakistan has both, the nuclear weapons and the delivery system. How many weapons they have is not so important. They may have six or more but they are capable of inflicting irreparable damage upon India. Secondly, that Pakistan has effectively safeguarded her nuclear arsenal. Kahuta which was vulnerable to Indian attack has been vacated.

The present nuclear storage facility is located at Chagai in Balochistan and is in a ready state for the pilots to take off before Indians could attempt to destroy them. Thirdly, Pakistan is building another 70 megawatt reactor at a secret location along the Indus.

According to Indians, by 1992 half of the construction and assembly work had been completed. Indian military experts believe that the programme when completed could yield bombs that would counterbalance India's vastly superior conventional force.

The above facts indicate that even if the Indian claims to their conventional military superiority are to be believed they fear they have been effectively neutralised by the emergence of Pakistan's nuclear capability. India has no effective answer to this new phenomenon. The fact is that whatever Indians may allege, the programme is peaceful but it poses a threat to India because they visualise it the same way as their own nuclear programme which they claim to be peaceful.

The only option open to India is roll back our entire programme and they are working towards that end. USA is being cultivated and Indians have apparently made some headway. There are clear indications that the programme has been frozen and as such a very effective weapon in the hands of Pakistan is being hunted due to the intervention of our erstwhile friend USA. This is being done in addition to a ban being put on the release of military weapons even where we had paid for them. This is a very unenviable position which makes us highly vulnerable and places India in a position to take initiatives which Pakistan may have no ability to effectively counter. As far as our friend USA is concerned whose policies are now weakening our defence capability, we cannot rely on them in moments of crisis and war. Our own experience leads us to that.

Where do we go from here? This is what DCC is apparently meeting to consider. How do we meet this challenge? Our approach should be two fold. Firstly we should tell our friends that our security has to be ensured. This would be in American interest also as we have always been their most allied ally. Verbal or even written undertakings as to our security will not be enough because they have not helped us in the past. What we need is that our defence capability be built up to a point where we are able to defend ourselves effectively against India. Secondly, we have to realise that our real assets are those people who have helped attain the present nuclear capability. They have to be looked after and duly safeguarded. They should not be allowed to be neutralised. Their abilities should be utilised on research and on further development of nuclear potential for peace. So long as these people are there we cannot be betrayed even if our political leadership succumbs to pressures, our nuclear experts are quite capable of giving what we need during the war and in moments of crisis. So let them work on peaceful nuclear projects. There is no reason why we



should not follow Indian example in this respect who continue to claim that their programme is strictly peaceful and as innocent and non-violent as Buddha. Let us also continue with our peaceful and non-violent nuclear programme.

Our electricity requirements alone justify such continuation and in fact, further advancement of our nuclear programme. We should, however, make one thing clear to the rest of the world i. e. that our nuclear programme is far more peaceful and non-violent than the Indian programme.

## RUSSIA

### CBW Commander Addresses Duma Hearings

LD2403150994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1357 GMT 24 Mar 94

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Yurkin]

[Text] Moscow March 24 TASS—"There are no toxic agents or wastes for a genuine chemist—they are all raw materials," this precept by the great Russian chemist Dmitriy Mendeleev was repeated time and again by scientists, who took the floor during the Duma hearings on Russia's participation in international agreements to scrap chemical weapons. Believing that Russia should derive definite benefits from the destruction of combat toxic agents, they moved to include in the state budget a separate item, envisaging spendings on disarmament and conversion programmes. Moreover, the scientists hold, it is necessary to launch a broad explanatory campaign and to discuss in a professional way all the problems linked with the destruction of weapons.

ITAR-TASS was told by Major-General Yuriy Tarasevich, assistant commander of radiation, chemical and biological defence forces of the Russian Federation, who took part in the deliberations, that a concept has already been drawn up for scrapping combat toxic substances, but this required special financing. Shortage of money for the development of special technologies, construction of various installations and other jobs, envisaged by the complex programme, retards the implementation of the already adopted decisions.

General Tarasevich believes that this year will be decisive for preparations to begin the planned destruction of chemical weapons. He denied rumours and publications on the alleged "incineration of chemical shells". "All the ammunition is being reliably guarded and poses no threat to the environment," Tarasevich said. He believes they could remain stored for several more years. "It would be wrong to shift the difficult job of destroying them to the next generation. There is every opportunity to do it now, relying on international agreements," Tarasevich noted.

### Newscast Features Chapayevsk CW Destruction Facility

PM2103103394 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1500 GMT 17 Mar 94

[From the "Novosti" newscast: Video report by Aleksey Deryabin and Aleksandr Safonov, identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Text] [150622] [Deryabin over video of interior of CW destruction facility] The Chapayevsk plant for the

destruction of chemical weapons was built in secret, but when the military's plans became known, the oblast's inhabitants together with activists of the Green movement, fearing that the plant might give rise to emergency situations, prevented it being operated.

Representatives from various regions of Russia where arsenals of chemical weapons are located have just paid a visit here. They were acquainted with the fully automated production process. Specialists believe that this method of processing lethal substances is the best.

According to a statement by a Ministry of Defense spokesman, the lesson provided by Chapayevsk has been learned. Henceforth the construction of all facilities connected with the destruction of chemical weapons will take place with the participation of the local authorities.

It is obvious that this sort of facility is indispensable. After all, maintaining numerous storage facilities containing toxic substances is not just expensive, it is dangerous. [150909] [video shows detailed views of interior of chemical weapon disposal facility]

### Report on Destruction of Chemical Weapons Arsenal

LD2403233194

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 2020 GMT on 24 March carried a two-minute video report by A. Peslyak in the "Vesti" newscast on Russia's destruction of its chemical weapons.

Peslyak began by recapping Russia's international commitment to destroy its chemical weapons and to discontinue their production. Archive footage was shown of the international convention on the destruction of chemical weapons.

He then reported on the debate on this topic in the State Duma on 24 March. Peslyak said that the main problem was storage of the weapons until they could be destroyed. The video showed the Duma being addressed by Major General Yuriy Tarasevich, deputy head of the chemical defense troops of the Russian Federation, who said: "You must understand that we cannot do anything about the storage areas themselves. Therefore we are saying at the present time that the most dangerous situation has arisen in these two arsenals we have. That's in (Kompapino) and especially in Gornyy, Saratov Oblast."

Peslyak said that the Defense Ministry was asking for half a billion dollars to finance the destruction of the weapons. The video then showed an excerpt of an interview with V. Nikonov, deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, identified by caption, who said:

"The means of eliminating the chemical weapons has yet to be decided upon. The sites where the destruction

of the chemical weapons is to take place have yet to be chosen. As you can see from the hearing, the settling of these matters with local authorities and, moreover, with local inhabitants is running into considerable difficulties."

Peslyak then pointed out that a factory in Chapayevsk equipped with ultra-modern technology was standing idle when it could be used for destroying chemical weapons. Video showed the exterior and interior of a factory, with its machinery wrapped in plastic sheeting. No one was taking responsibility for this, he said. He also said that it was difficult to know just how much toxic material there was to be destroyed saying there could be "40,000, 80,000 or 400,000 tonnes."

In addition to the factory, the video showed personnel in protective clothing working with munitions in the open, and rows of charred shells. An assortment of gas masks was also shown.

#### **Defense Ministry Aide on Cost of CW Destruction Program**

*PM2503152394 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 25 Mar 94 p 1*

[Article by Vladimir Yermolin: "Chemical Weapons Must Be Destroyed. But It Is an Expensive Business"]

[Text] The parliamentary hearings in the State Duma Thursday [24 March] showed how complex is the situation in connection with Russia's international commitments in the sphere of the destruction of chemical weapons (CW). Defense Ministry spokesman Major General Yuriy Tarasevich stressed that the military department expects the deputies to provide legislative support in such a difficult and expensive business as the destruction of chemical weapons. According to the military, the blueprint for CW destruction needs to be legislatively formalized. A draft blueprint will be presented to the State Duma in mid-April. We also need laws on CW destruction and on the social protection of the population in areas where these weapons are being destroyed.

Funding for all measures connected with preparations for the actual recovery of toxic substances and munitions is extremely uneven and inadequate. Getting rid of Russian chemical weapons will cost two trillion rubles [R] in 1993 prices. Meanwhile, some R10.4 billion are supposed to be allocated for this purpose in the current year. But we all know full well how funds are being allocated this year. The CW disarmament program is no exception.

There was a note of anxiety in what Maj. Gen. Yuriy Tarasevich said. A number of arsenals established back in the fifties in Udmurtia and Saratov Oblast are in need of a complete overhaul. In existing conditions such an overhaul is a very difficult and dangerous

business. One would like this to be not an exclusively military headache. Let us hope the hearings go some way toward this.

The military-political aspects of Russia's joining the Convention on the Destruction of Chemical Weapons were also examined during the hearings. The inevitable question arose: Might it not happen that our country will abandon this type of weapon, while other countries, including those bordering on Russia, will remain "chemically" armed and, moreover, will reach a new level as a result of scientific developments? In general terms the Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry spokesmen assured those present that in this case there are reliable control mechanisms in place and the world community provides certain guarantees. But the detailed reply to this question obviously had to wait until the hearings resumed behind closed doors.

We would point out that the Convention on Chemical Weapons was signed in Paris in 1993. So far it has been signed by 156 states. But it has been ratified by only four: Sweden, Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Fiji. Whether Russia is to become the fifth depends on how convincing the Foreign and Defense Ministries' pro-ratification arguments are in the eyes of the parliamentarians. All I would say is that, in the event of ratification, we will be able to count on financial assistance from Western countries and the United States.

#### **Document on Submarine Reactors' Disposal Cited**

*PM2303111794 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
23 Mar 94 p 3*

[Report by Marat Zubko: "Russia Will Sink Reactors in Kara Sea"]

[Text] Helsinki—The Norwegian ecological organization "Bellona" has found out the details of the forthcoming removal from combat service of 150 nuclear submarines in the Northern Fleet.

"Bellona" members Nils Bemer and Tomas Nilsen [both names as transliterated] have gained access to Northern Fleet documents which state that in accordance with the START II treaty within the next few years Russia must destroy 150 nuclear submarines with 278 reactors on board.

The authors of the report assert that so far only two submarines have been dismantled in the Northern Fleet but that nuclear fuel has been removed from the reactors of 34 ships. The main part of the submarines will be dismantled in Severodvinsk: There they will extract 206 reactors and 45,000 used fuel elements from the submarines' bellies.

The Norwegians claim that new dry docks and storage facilities for radioactive waste, and moorings for the submarines which have been written off are to be constructed on the Kola peninsula.



The construction should have begun already but so far the majority of establishments are at the planning stage, the report says.

Of course, some of the fuel elements, the "Bellona" experts estimate, could be sent to the "Mayak" storage facility in Siberia. But what is to be done with the other fuel elements, the reactors themselves, and their reactor rooms? In this connection Berner and Nilsen have the following to say:

"Of the documents we have read and the talks we have had with knowledgeable people it has become clear to us that the Russian authorities have two possible courses of action. The first is to return to the practice of submerging radioactive waste, including reactors, in the Kara Sea, which Russia renounced a few years ago. The second is to construct a major new storage facility somewhere in the Northwest of Russia.

"However," the report's authors continue, "it is known that the storage facilities existing on the Kola peninsula are already full and there is no money to construct new ones. So we believe that the most feasible option is connected with burying the waste at sea. Perhaps that is why Russia is not signing the London convention which bans the discharge of waste into the seas and oceans...."

#### **Collision of Two Nuclear Subs Reported**

##### **Little Damage**

LD2403090094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
0854 GMT 24 Mar 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 24 TASS—Two Russian submarines from the Northern Fleet armed with nuclear weapons collided on Wednesday, TASS learned from reliable sources in the main headquarters of the Russian Navy.

The subs sustained inconsiderable damage which poses no danger for personnel and environment, according to the source.

No other details were immediately available.

##### **Subs Return to Base**

LD2403103094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1006 GMT 24 Mar 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 24 TASS—Two Russian nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet collided on Wednesday in the Barents Sea while training joint manoeuvres and the press service of the Russian Navy qualified the incident as "a contact" of the U-boats.

Nobody was injured, the armaments and equipment of the submarines is in proper order and the radioactive situation is normal, the press service said on Thursday adding that the subs returned to their base themselves.

It was earlier reported that the "contact" resulted in inconsiderable damages which pose no danger to personnel and environment.

#### **Vladivostok Orders Halt To Scrapping of Atomic Submarines**

LD2303154094 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian  
1430 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] Today, the administration of Maritime Kray released a statement in which it said that dismantling and scrapping of atomic submarines is to be halted at the Zvezda yard at the settlement of Bolshoy Kamen. Discharge of liquid radioactive waste stored aboard the tanker DMT-5 into the Sea of Japan is also planned. The tanker is now in a dangerous condition. The radioactive waste poses a real threat to Vladivostok and a number of areas of Maritime Kray. That was a report from POSTFACTUM agency.

#### **Chelyabinsk-65 Offers To Process Ukrainian Nuclear Fuel**

LD2303182694 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian  
1444 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] [Announcer] No doubt our listeners recall that, after the Chernobyl tragedy, there was an outbreak of radiation-phobia in the USSR, as it was then. Armenia's nuclear power station was shut down. Stations that were virtually ready for commissioning were not handed over. Construction of new reactors was frozen. Nuclear power stations cannot generate electricity unless their fuel is regularly replaced—but shipment of fuel for reprocessing was suspended. However, the situation has now begun to change. That is the view of Yevgeniy (Dzikun), chief engineer of the nuclear reprocessing plant at the town of Chelyabinsk-65. Journalist Yevgeniy Stankevich spoke to him. [begin recording]

Dzikun: Signs of a revival in our industry are visible, for the moment at least. Why do I say so? There is nowhere else for atomic power stations to turn to. They are already asking us to accept and reprocess this fuel. So we have carried out several shipments and removed fuel from atomic stations. We have similar plans for the second quarter as well. So we will have some work.

Stankevich: Will Ukraine's nuclear warheads be handled at your plant?

Dzikun: Since 1986 our plant has had nothing whatsoever to do with the production of warheads, although that was our job from 1948 onward. In fact the works celebrated its 45th anniversary in December 1993. We consider that the removal and correct use of uranium and plutonium from warheads does present problems. We see a possibility of our participation in this work.

This is within our capability. But if we are to play a practical part in the implementation of these plans, a certain amount of modernization will have to be done to the installations we have here, because the requirements applicable to these materials are slightly different from those that existed when these warheads were manufactured. These materials will now be used for civilian purposes. If this task is to be resolved in practical way, financial questions will have to be settled first.

**Stankevich:** Bearing in mind that foreign atomic stations are paying you to reprocess fuel, would you reprocess fuel for our former neighbors and Russian stations for free, or will you make them pay something?

**Dzikun:** Naturally, our prices are differentiated. There is one level of prices for the countries in the East European bloc, as it used to be. There is another level of prices for CIS countries, and a third level of prices for atomic stations in Russia. So you cannot say that we are making a fortune out of this. A large part of the money we make out of this, especially the hard currency, is spent on tackling ecological problems in the oblast. The combine receives roughly 35-40 percent of the seemingly large sums that figure in contracts. That is a level that only just covers our own overheads. [end recording]

**Announcer:** In addition to what Yevgeniy Dzikun, the chief engineer of the nuclear reprocessing plant at the town of Chelyabinsk-65, said, let me add that the Armenian nuclear power station has been unfrozen. It is very possible that Chelyabinsk-65 will reprocess the fuel from Armenia.

#### **Production of Weapon-Grade Plutonium To Stop by 'Late 1994'**

*LD2203124194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1217 GMT 22 Mar 94*

[Repirt by ITAR-TASS correspondent veronika romanenkov]

[Text] Moscow March 22 TASS—Russia's atomic industry will be ready to stop the production of weapon-grade plutonium by late 1994. A Russo-American agreement to this effect is planned to be signed as early as in summer. The arrangement was reached during a visit of Russian specialists to the United States, Valeriy Bogdan, business manager of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, told ITAR-TASS on Tuesday.

Three reactors producing weapon-grade plutonium continue to operate in Russia (one in Krasnoyarsk-26 and two in Tomsk-7). But these are dual-purpose reactors. They supply energy and heating not only to Krasnoyarsk-26 and Tomsk-7, but also to regional centres. The Ministry of Atomic Energy plans to

phase out these reactors in 1997-1998. Their service life is almost completed. District power plants will be built instead.

Storages in Russia are now filled to the limit with weapon-grade plutonium and with plutonium released from dismantled nuclear weapons. There are large plutonium stockpiles in Russia and in the United States and there is no sense in continuing to manufacture plutonium.

However, Russia is now short of funds, and from the economical viewpoint it cannot stop plutonium-producing reactors and replace them with district power plants. Valeriy Bogdan believes it is necessary to reach agreement with the United States so that it help resolve the financial problem. The United States has stated the intention of helping to get funds, without giving guarantees of money, he said.

#### **Deputy Minister Hails 'Advantageous' Uranium Deal With U.S.**

*PM2303100594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 23 Mar 94 First Edition p 4*

[ITAR-TASS report: "Deal With United States Is Advantageous"]

[Text] The "uranium deal" with the United States is advantageous to Russia, Nikolay Yegorov, Russian Federation deputy minister of atomic energy, believes. It will help Russian enterprises to survive.

On his return from Washington, where he signed an appropriate document with the U.S. secretary of commerce, Nikolay Yegorov disclosed that over the next two years Russia will now be able to supply the United States with up to 3,000 tonnes of uranium concentrate and a considerable quantity of enriched uranium worth a total of \$150 million. Previously there were no deliveries in view of the agreement imposed on Russia in 1992 whereby the export of Russian uranium was authorized only at prices that were effectively 1.5 times the world prices, the deputy minister emphasized.

Now an opportunity is opening up to resume sales on U.S. markets, which will help Russian uranium-extracting enterprises to improve their position. A special feature of the new agreement is the establishment of a procedure for joint sales whereby 50 percent of the Russian deal is combined with a similar quantity of American sales, and this mixed uranium is sold to consumers.

"The next two years will be especially difficult for Russia," Nikolay Yegorov said. "So the extra sources of freely convertible currency will come in very handy."

## ESTONIA

### Government Prepares for Scrapping of Nuclear Reactors

LD2503132594 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network  
in Estonian 1100 GMT 25 Mar 94

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] According to government instructions, several ministries must ensure preparations for the scrapping of the nuclear reactors located at the Russian Federation's naval training center for nuclear submarine crews at Paldiski [near Tallinn], as reported to ETA [Estonian Telegraph Agency] by the government press service.

The Environment Ministry must ensure that radiation levels are constantly monitored, the Economics Ministry must ensure an uninterrupted supply of electricity for the removal of nuclear fuel and radioactive materials, the Interior Ministry must, according to the government instructions, ensure security on site and necessary resources in case of fire and for the evacuation of the population in case of a threat of radiation. The Social Affairs Ministry will be responsible for medical assistance and the Ministry for Roads and Communications for the safe and unimpeded rail passage for the containers carrying nuclear fuel. The Foreign Ministry must draft a basic agreement on the work on scrapping of the nuclear reactors and related issues. The Interior Ministry will be coordinating these tasks; it must draw up a general plan for the removal of nuclear fuel from the nuclear reactors by 28 March. By today [25 March], all the above ministries must present their recommendations to the Interior Ministry on the expenses budget on the scrapping of the nuclear reactors.

### Laar, Einseln Questioned on Israeli Weapons, NATO Standards

WS2203102194 Tallinn ETA in English 0756 GMT  
22 Mar 94

[From 22 March RAHVA HAAL, PAEVALEHT, HOMMIKULEHT; "News Bulletin" No. 55/94]

[Text] Tuesday, March 22—Yesterday's questions and answers session was dominated by the Israeli weapons deal. Prime Minister Mart Laar and Commander in Chief Aleksander Einseln had to answer questions concerning their compatibility to the NATO standards and quality.

The Israeli-made small arms do not meet the STANAG agreements since Israel is not a member of the NATO, General Einseln explained. However, since the agreements concern primarily ammunition, the weapons can be considered as meeting the STANAG requirements, he stressed. Einseln added that the government

had not approached him before on the NATO standards issue and the decision to purchase weapons from Israel had been made before he became Commander in Chief.

MP Andra Veidemann questioned Mart Laar on the incomplete weapons consignments and the premier claimed the drawbacks to be insignificant. Laar mentioned some missing cartridge clips and bayonets, stressed that this does not prevent the weapons from being used, and added that the Israeli company will supply the missing parts. Estonian experts will later check on the completeness of the consignments before they will be shipped to Estonia, Laar assured the parliament.

Further questions concerned the presented 23-millimetre anti-aircraft guns. Laar told the Riigikogu [parliament] that the decision had been made after an appeal by GHQ chief of staff Colonel Ants Laaneots during his visit to Israel last year. Laar claimed that the anti-aircraft guns as well as the machine guns had really been a present, outside the consignment which had been paid for. The Israeli supplier will help to repair the unusable weapons, he added. But the opposition members disagreed. Peeter Lorents claimed to have rarely heard "such a barefaced lie" as told by Laar and further explained that tests had disclosed more serious drawbacks with the weapons. He specifically mentioned defective mines and anti-tank ammunition. Lorents was seconded by MP Jiri Toompuu, who claimed to have seen the original agreement, according to which the defective anti-aircraft guns were a part of the deal. They were supported by some other members. Centrist MP Olav Anton commented that only the Defence Minister, who has never served in the army, could believe such vague explanations.

Centrist MP Liina Tdnnisson asked about the renting of the building in 3 Toompuiestee and Laar explained that the government had decided to hold an open auction. But he repeated that the government keeps supporting the idea of renting it to the company "Koneston", which intends to organise a Russian business centre there.

Laar rejected the claims that the mari airfield is being used for transporting stolen cars out of Estonia. The Estonian border guard is checking the leaving aircraft, he said.

Laar also explained that the government had decided to spread the funds of the national budget between different banks purely in order to cut the risks. He added that a closed contest will be held to determine the banks which will handle the funds next year.

Laar assured the parliament that the investigation of the cases when police officers mistreated Defence League members is continuing and Interior Minister Heiki Arike has been instructed to pursue the matter. But the names of most policemen who allegedly beat the volunteers are still unknown, Laar admitted.



The "Independents" faction of the Riigikogu elected Jaanus Raidal its chairman and Mart Niklus vice-chairman. Other members of the six-man faction are Ants Erm, Avo Kiir, Kalju Põldvere and Toivo Uustalu. Raidal announced that the faction meeting approved a resolution to support the reinforcement of law and order in Estonia.

## KHAZAKHSTAN

**Agreement With U.S. on Defense Conversion Signed**  
LD1903133294 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*  
1308 GMT 19 Mar 94

[Report by *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Vladimir Akimov]

[Text] Almaty March 19 TASS—U.S. Secretary of defence William Perry, who is currently in Kazakhstan on a working visit, was received in the republican Ministry of Defence on Saturday. Mr Perry also attended a session of the joint Kazakhstan-American committee on defence industry conversion to civilian production.

The meetings, and the talks with President Nursultan Nazarbayev several hours earlier, resulted in the signing of an agreement on the conversion of the Kazakhstan defence industry to civilian production.

The agreement is actually a supplement to the earlier reached accord on the dismantling of the SS-18 missile silos and ensures an influx of an aggregate of \$70 million to the republic for defence industry conversion needs.

These documents are intended to ensure the dismantling of combat nuclear missile systems based in Kazakhstan and convert them to suit civilian and peaceful purposes, and additional training of the military personnel subject to demobilisation.

U.S. businesses are to be invited to help the defence industry conversion effort. In particular, a number of American companies will be involved in the reconstruction of appropriate enterprises for them to change over to the manufacture of consumer goods.

Mr. Perry and his party are to leave for Baykonur cosmodrome on March 20.

**Secretary Perry Visits Baykonur Cosmodrome**  
LD2003072794 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*  
0616 GMT 20 Mar 94

[Report by *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Vladimir Akimov]

[Text] Almaty, March 20 (TASS)—On completing the official part of his Kazakh visit, U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry departed for the Baykonur cosmodrome from the Kazakh capital.

The secretary's visit to the cosmodrome is of a sight-seeing nature. However, the aims pursued by this trip are self-evident. The U.S. side is interested in studying Baykonur's possibilities with a view to U.S. participation in the use of its unique potential.

In the opinion of several local analysts, Kazakhstan tries to bring pressure on Russia by organising the U.S. defence secretary's visit to Baykonur. Several rounds of the Kazakh-Russian talks held in the recent past brought closer the positions of the sides.

However, they could not agree, for the time being, on the period of a lease and the amount of a lease payment.

Almaty believes that if the United States displays readiness for cooperation with the republic in the use of the cosmodrome, it will be possible to cut short the duration of its leasing to Russia and, consequently, to start earlier the establishment of an international space company or any other form of its utilisation on a multilateral basis.

Following the visit to Baykonur, Perry and his party will go to Kiev.

## UKRAINE

**Secretary Perry Visits Strategic Missile Unit**  
LD2203195494 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*  
1925 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Report by *ITAR-TASS* special correspondent Aleksey Agureyev, *UKRINFORM* correspondent Sergey Balykov]

[Text] Kiev March 22 TASS—U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry has been the first foreign defence minister to visit a strategic missile unit in Pervomaysk, Ukraine, and a classified military plant in Dnepropetrovsk.

Ukraine ranks the world's third in the number of nuclear warheads stationed on its territory. It is preceded only by the United States and Russia. Two types of missiles are stationed in Pervomaysk, the Nikolayev region. Part of missiles have been dismantled.

The U.S. Pentagon head visited a dismantled missile silo to see a de-activated SS-24 missile. The secretary was told by Ukrainian servicemen that warheads have been removed from 30 SS-24 missiles and eleven SS-19 missiles. All in all, this will be done to 46 SS-24 and 30 SS-19 missiles.

Last year Ukrainian specialists took off duty two regiments of strategic missiles. One of them to include ten systems was withdrawn from Pervomaysk. Nuclear warheads have been dismantled and sent to technical storages, missiles have been removed from silos, fuel and oxidizer were put into special tanks, loaded into freight cars and set to the Yuzhmash plant in Dnepropetrovsk.

The U.S. defence secretary visited the Yuzhmash plant, which earlier produced the world's only high-precision heavy missiles capable to deliver up to ten warheads of megaton weight. The plant and its design bureau produced four generations of intercontinental ballistic missiles and made the first artificial earth satellite of the Cosmos series together with the rocket booster.

Now the plant continues to produce space equipment, simultaneously with first Ukrainian trolley-buses and wind engines.

**Supreme Council Candidate Calls for Retaining Nuclear Arms**

*LD2103133194 Stockholm Radio Sweden in Swedish  
1130 GMT 21 Mar 94*

[Text] Before the forthcoming parliamentary elections in Ukraine, several important parties there are demanding that, despite previous agreements, the country should

retain some of its nuclear weapons. "The Echo" program correspondent Kjell Albin Abrahamson reports from Ukraine.

**Abrahamson:** Today Yeltsin is governing Russia, but tomorrow Zhirinovskiy may come to power. Today President Clinton is supporting Ukraine, but we know nothing about the next U.S. President. This was said by Ukrainian General (Oleksandr Rul), who will stand as a candidate of the super-nationalist Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists in the parliamentary elections. He now sees nationalism and nuclear weapons as the best guarantee for an independent and sovereign Ukraine.

Most political parties here share that view, including the Republican Party—an offshoot of the dissident movement—and the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, which want Ukraine to retain some of its nearly 1,800 nuclear warheads. General (Rul) points out: It is us, not you who are in the immediate frontline in the event of a Russian attack.

## AUSTRIA

**Police Halt Illegal Trade in Missile-Propellant Components***AU2803131394 Vienna KURIER in German 28 Mar 94 p 10*

[Wilhelm Theuretsbacher report: "Missile Terrorism With Chemicals From Salzburg?"]

[Text] Dictators in the Third World were highly interested. A special propellant is required for firing missiles on Europe, which could be purchased in Salzburg—until last week.

In a concerted action by the Economics, Finance, and Interior Ministries, the filing cabinets of a Salzburg firm were opened during a search of the office. The subsidiary of a foreign company produced special aluminum and magnesium compounds, which reached Latin America and the Middle and Far East in a roundabout way.

The buyers are mainly states that are trying to convert obsolete missile systems. The most widespread missiles—like the "Scud" missiles that became known as a result of the Gulf war—are being propelled by liquid fuels and have a range of 600 km in the original version. Only a few states have systems with wider ranges. Numerous countries, including Libya, Syria, and Iran, want to increase the range to 2,000 km with the aid of solid propellants. Thus, "targets" like Vienna, Paris, or Rome are becoming realistic.

The basis for the conversion is the metallic powder that was offered illegally in Salzburg. The investigating authorities have examined dozens of deliveries. Like nearly everything else in this case, the exact extent of the damage is a top secret.

The Salzburg company has violated the amended foreign trade law. The responsible officials are facing 10-year prison terms. Moreover, the deliveries also infringed the MTCR Agreement [expansion not known], designed to prevent the proliferation of missile technology. The suspects deny any criminal intent. The fuel components can also be used for civilian purposes—such as fireworks...

For the Austrian police, the operation was a first in a new criminal sphere, called "proliferation." It refers to the illegal procurement of nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare agents, including the relevant carrier technology. These economic crimes with an intensive intelligence background are new ground for the police. The usual methods do not yield the desired results in this area. The police needs highly qualified experts like physical and chemical engineers and economic experts.

The counterstrategy is a police reform. As a result of the total reform of the antiterrorism task force (EBT), the Interior Ministry has scored several international

successes in the sphere of terrorism, the smuggling of refugees, and nuclear crime. This is one of the reasons why EBT leader Josef Dick was appointed as provisional head of Group D (criminal police). His task is to initiate the overdue reform among the criminal police.

## FRANCE

**Le Triomphant Submarine Secretly Launched in Cherbourg***LD2903104294 Paris France-Inter Radio Network in French 1000 GMT 29 Mar 94*

[Text] The submarine Le Triomphant was secretly launched in Cherbourg this weekend. More details now with Herve de Haro from Cherbourg:

Haro: Le Triomphant is a high-tech marvel. With a displacement of 12,640 tons and a length of 138 meters, it is much larger than its predecessors. It is faster too and should also be extremely quiet, one of the quietest in the world—it could even be called a stealth submarine. Its propeller is classified top secret and is careened to protect it from preying eyes and to make it even more silent.

Le Triomphant is now in its natural element. It will sail in a few months time for its first sea trials. The first concern of the DCN [Direction of Navy shipbuilding] is to find all the noises made by the various equipment on board the submarine. All the noises will be recorded and analyzed, and engineers will have to reduce them.

Le Triomphant must be able to sail undetected even by the most sophisticated detection equipment. This is Herve de Haro reporting from Cherbourg for France Inter.

## GERMANY

**SPD Calls for 'Restrictive European Arms Export Controls'***AU1903204794 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 19 Mar 94 p 4*

["hll" report: "SPD Wants to Be 'Protective Power'"]

[Text] Bonn, 18 March—In their draft of a government program, which was presented on Friday [18 March], the Social Democrats present themselves as a "strong protective power" for the social interests of families and for those at a material disadvantage, in particular in eastern Germany. In addition, they announce that they will act against disturbances of peaceful coexistence with "determination and consistency."

In order to combat organized crime, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) wants to have assets impounded if there "is the urgent and justified suspicion that they come from serious crime or are to be used for such crimes, unless the owner proves the



opposite." If all other methods fail, the authorities "must have the right to mount microphones in apartments and to record conversations," which, however, is to be linked with strict preconditions.

The SPD also wants to "strengthen the presence of police in streets and squares." Combating right-wing extremism as well as the integration of foreigners are cited as focal issues.

Regarding energy policy, the draft program sticks to the goal of opting out of nuclear energy, but it does not give a schedule for it: "We want to set a course toward opting out of nuclear energy by replacing the nuclear law with a further developed law on opting out of nuclear energy." Just as the current coalition government, the SPD wants to reduce the emission of carbon dioxide by one-fourth by the year 2005. German hard coal and brown coal are to be used as ongoing energy supplies and the use of hard coal is to be financially secured also beyond the year 2000.

As for foreign policy, Germany's co-responsibility for worldwide problems is stressed under the keyword "partnership for development and peace." The draft notes: "No Bundeswehr participation in wars" but only in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. It demands "restrictive European arms export controls." Europe must become an "environmental and social union."

The government program will be finally adopted by the SPD congress in Halle on 22 June. The authors of the draft, the size of which has doubled compared with earlier versions, are convinced that the majority of the party agrees with their statements.

## GREECE

**Air Base Guard Fails Attempted Missile Theft**  
*NC2303185994 Athens ATHENS NEWS in English*  
22 Mar 94 p 1

[Text] The Defence Ministry has launched an investigation into an aborted attempt by two unidentified armed men to steal sophisticated anti-aircraft missiles from a military airbase and munitions depot, near Patrai.

Taking advantage of a defective ground lighting system which had left half the base in darkness, the two men scaled a chain-link fence surrounding the Araxos military base around 4am, entering undetected. After breaking into a munitions warehouse, they grabbed a box of what they believed to contain anti-aircraft missile shells and made for the camp perimeter.

But their escape was foiled by a guard, who shouted for them to stop. Opening fire on the guard, the two men raced across the compound and escaped over the fence. With army guards still in pursuit, they dropped the box in a nearby ditch. It was later found to be full of empty 20mm Rheinmetall RH202 shells. Military police launched a manhunt in the surrounding area while anti-terrorism experts and a forensics team were ordered to Araxos to aid in the manhunt.

The Defence Ministry has also ordered an internal inquiry amid questions about possible security breaches at the base, which includes an airfield for fighter craft, a communications center and munitions stores.

Ministry sources said preliminary evidence suggested the botched operation was a sophisticated operation planned by professionals. News reports highlighted similarities to a December 1989 rocket snatch from a Larissa base by the November 17 urban guerrilla group but officials did not rule out the possibility of a simple arms heist.

### IAEA Report Alleges DPRK Replaced Fuel Rods in 5-MW Reactor

SK2103064194 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean 0510 GMT 21 Mar 94

[Text] In view of the results so far achieved on the International Atomic Energy Agency's nuclear inspections of North Korea's facilities, North Korea is learned to have carried out extension work [pogang-gongsa] on the facilities inside the radiochemical laboratory since February, while replacing some nuclear fuel rods in the 5-megawatt reactor. Correspondent Cha Man-sun reports from Vienna: [begin recording]

**Correspondent Cha Man-sun:** According to a report to be submitted to a special Board of Governors' meeting on the result of the North's nuclear facilities inspections, it has been revealed for the first time that the IAEA conducted a non-destructive analysis, involving neutron and gamma measurement to grasp the substance and replacement timing of the spent fuel rods of the 5-megawatt reactor's spent fuel storage.

Regarding this, nuclear experts analyzed that when things are taken together from the recent inspection results, North Korea has replaced some nuclear fuel rods since last February. North Korea had maintained that it has not replaced the 5-megawatt nuclear reactor's fuel rods. They said the result of the analysis of the nuclear fuel rod counter [kyesugi] which watches the movement of the spent nuclear fuel will prove this.

The report stressed that the continuity of the inspection can be maintained only when inspections of the 5-megawatt nuclear reactor are resumed after six weeks.

The report also revealed that an IAEA inspection team was restricted from making inspections—such as extracting samples and wastes of nuclear materials, and measuring radioactivity—from the six major facilities—including a plutonium refinery facility inside the radiochemical laboratory, a nuclear waste storage, a reprocessing facility, a radioactivity gas filtering device [kicheyogwasisol], thus hinting that North Korea has supplemented the indoor facilities of the reprocessing facility for the last year. [End recording]

### Text of IAEA Resolution Finding DPRK in 'Non-Compliance'

AU2103162594 Vienna International Atomic Energy Agency Press Release in English 1510 GMT 21 Mar 94 (Tentative)

[IAEA "Press Release—for use of information media—not an official record": "IAEA Board of Governors Holds Meeting on Inspections in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)"]

[Text] The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency held a meeting on March 21 to consider the situation arising from the prevention by

the DPRK, during an IAEA inspection visit to the DPRK March 1-15, 1994, of activities to verify whether nuclear material had been diverted since the Agency's last inspection in 1993.

Following its discussion, the Board adopted a resolution, inter alia expressing its grave concern, finding the DPRK in further non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement; calling upon the DPRK immediately to allow the IAEA to complete all required inspection activities and to comply fully with its Safeguards Agreement; and requesting the Director General to transmit the resolution and his report to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.

The full text of the Board's resolution, as adopted, is attached: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AGENCY AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (INFCIRC/403) THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS,

- (a) RECALLING the Board of Governors' resolutions GOV/2636 of 25 February 1993, GOV/2639 of 19 March 1993, GOV/2692 of 23 September 1993, the General Conference's resolution GC (XXXVII) RES/624 of 1 October 1993, and in particular, GOV/2645 of 1 April 1993, which found the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to be in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/403) and referred the matter to the Security Council of the United Nations,
- (b) RECALLING ALSO resolution 825 (1993) adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on 11 May 1993, which, INTER ALIA, requested the Director General to report on this matter to the Security Council,
- (c) NOTING the Director General's written and oral reports of 21 March 1994 and GOV/2687/ADD.4 in which he stated that the Agency inspection team was not allowed to conduct indispensable and agreed inspection activities at the DPRK radiochemical laboratory, and that the Agency is unable to draw conclusions as to whether there has been either diversion of nuclear material or reprocessing at the radiochemical laboratory since February 1993,
- (d) NOTING FURTHER the Director General's reaffirmation that the Secretariat remains available to perform inspection activities in the DPRK in accordance with its procedures and agreements, and
- (e) TAKING ACCOUNT of the fact that the DPRK is a party to the NPT and is bound by its safeguards commitments;

- (1) **EXPRESSES** grave concern that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has failed to implement essential elements of resolutions of the Board and the General Conference concerning its non-compliance with its safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/403)
- (2) **FINDS** that the DPRK is in further non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, has aggravated this situation by not allowing IAEA inspectors to conduct indispensable inspection activities and that the Agency consequently remains unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the terms of the safeguards agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- (3) **STRONGLY ENDORSES** and commends the patient and impartial efforts of the Director General and the Secretariat to implement the safeguards agreement;
- (4) **REGRETS** the statement in the Agency's efforts to resolve the DPRK safeguards issue, as requested by the Security Council of the United Nations, due to the lack of cooperation of the DPRK;
- (5) **CALLS UPON** the DPRK immediately to allow the IAEA to complete all requested inspection activities and to comply fully with its safeguards agreement;
- (6) **REQUESTS** the Director General to transmit this resolution and his report to all members of the Agency and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations in accordance with Article XII.C. of the Statute; and
- (7) **REMAINS SEIZED** of the matter and **REQUESTS** the Director General to report back to the Board any significant developments at its next meeting when it will consider, if necessary, further measures in accordance with Article XII.C. of the Statute.

#### **YONHAP Reports IAEA Adoption of Resolution on DPRK Issue**

SK2203011294 Seoul YONHAP in English 0050 GMT  
22 Mar 94

[Text] Vienna, March 21 (YONHAP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency's board of governors overwhelmingly adopted a resolution Monday referring the North Korean nuclear dispute to the United Nations Security Council.

The vote on the resolution, sponsored by 17 board members including the United States, Britain, Germany and Russia, was 25 for, one against and five abstentions.

China, whose position on the issue had attracted the most interest, abstained along with India, Indonesia, Brazil and Lebanon.

The only opposing vote was cast by Libya. Cuba and Syria did not take part in the voting.

The resolution contained wording that said the IAEA will notify the UN Security Council of the matter.

However, it is believed the resolution is more than an act of notification as it indirectly urges the Security Council to implement countermeasures, observers said.

The resolution expresses the most serious concern ever by the IAEA board of governors over the possibility that North Korea has diverted nuclear material for other than stated purposes.

It asks IAEA Director-General Hans Blix to report the resolution not only to all IAEA members but also the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council.

The resolution specifically mentions that the IAEA could not prove that North Korea had not used nuclear material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. The observers deemed it significant that the IAEA has used the terms "nuclear weapons" and "nuclear explosive devices" for the first time in its resolution on the North Korean issue.

The resolution, consisting of seven items, expresses regret that the IAEA was unable to fulfill the Security Council's request to resolve the dispute because of North Korea's uncooperative attitude.

It recalls that the Security Council instructed Blix last May to report back to the council on how the issue was progressing, thus indirectly requesting that the Security Council eventually deliberate countermeasures.

At the same time, the resolution urged North Korea once again to allow unfettered IAEA inspections, implement the nuclear safeguards agreement and fulfill its obligations as a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT).

The IAEA said the North Korean problem will remain a major pending issue and warned that, if Pyongyang does not fulfill its obligations under the nuclear safeguards agreement, it will take follow-up steps in accordance with its charter including disqualification and suspension of technology cooperation.

In his opening report to the board meeting, Blix said inspection of the radiochemical laboratory was a must and North Korea had already agreed to allow it.

Despite its earlier agreement, North Korea refused to let IAEA inspectors check the laboratory, making it impossible to determine whether the stalinist state had



diverted nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes since the last inspection in February.

Blix warned that the IAEA would no longer remain silent on the issue.

The IAEA is ready to send experts again to check facilities they could not inspect last time. In order to do so, North Korea must offer the UN watchdog a clear commitment that it would allow all inspections.

The North Korean representative denounced the resolution, charging that the IAEA had reached a hasty and irrational conclusion and was putting unjust pressure on Pyongyang.

### IAEA Spokesman Views DPRK's Refusal of Inspections

AU2303083994 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0516 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Telephone interview with David Kyd, information director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, by Hans-Joachim Wiese; Kyd in Vienna—live]

[Text] [Wiese] Mr. Kyd, the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] is responsible for the inspection of the nuclear facilities in the DPRK—actually not only in the DPRK but all over the world—but it is massively prevented from doing its duty by Pyongyang. Therefore, the day before yesterday the IAEA Governors' Council decided to refer the issue to the UN Security Council. What does your Agency expect from that?

Kyd: We are indeed the inspection agency, but, of course, we cannot force the DPRK to open the facilities in the DPRK for our inspections, if the DPRK has problems with that. And this is the case. Our director general will go to New York today. There will be a UN Security Council meeting, and I could imagine that the Security Council will adopt a resolution next week. We hope that the DPRK will realize that the matter has to be clarified and that this will increase security not only in Asia but also in the DPRK itself.

Wiese: Inspectors of your organization have already gone to the DPRK, and they have been able to visit a few nuclear facilities. The problem probably is just one very specific facility. Mr. Kyd, what are the specific findings of the IAEA regarding the question of whether or not the DPRK has the nuclear bomb?

Kyd: For a nuclear weapon you need three things: First, a carrier system; second, an ignition mechanism—one must be able to master that; and third, fissionable material, which is plutonium. It is our job to find out how much plutonium the DPRK actually has. The DPRK claims that it has produced just a few grams. However, we suspect that there is more than that. We do not yet know how much and we were prevented from finding out because over the past two weeks, as

you have already mentioned, we have not been permitted to take samples in one facility, in one laboratory, where plutonium has been produced in the past, to find out what the level of radioactivity is like in this facility. This means that we do not know whether this facility is utilized fully or whether, as the North Koreans claim, nothing has been produced there recently.

Wiese: The IAEA resolution, which I mentioned at the beginning, threatens more far-reaching measures, if the DPRK continues to be unwilling to cooperate. What is one to understand by that?

Kyd: We ourselves can take only limited measures because the IAEA is actually responsible only for inspections. However, in the UN Security Council it is clear that both a warning and economic sanctions are conceivable if all members of the UN Security Council, including China, agree to them.

Wiese: The DPRK, however, is threatening to leave the Nonproliferation Treaty if international pressure continues. What would such a step mean?

Kyd: Of course, it would be very bad, because 161 countries are participating in this treaty and that it would be the first time in 25 years that a country leaves the treaty. It would create a precedent and would not to be welcomed. On the other hand, the international community also has to consider whether, after one year, there is any sense in negotiating with a country that is obviously unwilling to fulfill its obligations. This is not a good example for other countries in the future. One could expect another country to try to get concessions by saying: I am neither in the treaty nor outside. What do you offer me?

We want to prevent that, too.

Wiese: Mr. Kyd, next year an international conference must decide whether or not the Nonproliferation Treaty, which was concluded 25 years ago, as you said, is to be extended. The day before yesterday, the following countries did not join the vote of the Board of Governors—either by abstaining or by voting against: Libya, Brazil, India, and Indonesia. China abstained. All these are potential nuclear powers. This is not a good sign for the future of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Kyd: I believe that one cannot draw such a conclusion from that. It was rather a disagreement about whether or not pressure of this kind by the UN Security Council is appropriate, whether or not it will be effective. I certainly believe that the Nonproliferation Treaty will be extended next spring, that is, in one year. Whether for another 10 years or for another 25 years is not yet clear. However, it is a treaty that has been in effect for 25 years already. There are only five nuclear powers all over the world and three so-called threshold countries—Israel, Pakistan, and India—which have perhaps already mastered this technology. This is a good result. Now we have South Africa in this treaty, and

soon Brazil and Argentina will join and the republics of the former Soviet Union. I think this is certainly positive.

Of course, now there is an acute case—namely the DPRK. On the other hand, however, 160 countries have joined the treaty, and we believe the current case should not be interpreted too dramatically. Of course, for northeast Asia, however, it would indeed be a serious case if the DPRK were to leave the treaty. Then the situation will become very sensitive there, not only for South Korea but also for Japan, and even for China.

Wiese: Thank you very much. This was David Kyd, information director of the IAEA in Vienna. Good bye, Mr. Kyd.

#### **IAEA Spokesman Says DPRK Building 2d, 3d Nuclear Reactor**

SK2303235394 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
2100 GMT 23 Mar 94

[AP, YONHAP report from Vienna]

[Text] International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] Spokesman David Kyd disclosed on 23 March that it seems that North Korea will complete the construction of its second nuclear reactor within this year. Spokesman Kyd said that North Korea is building its second nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. The 50 megawatt nuclear reactor is scheduled for completion by the end of this year.

He said that North Korea is currently building a third nuclear reactor in Taechon, which is even more secluded than Yongbyon, and that the 200 megawatt reactor will begin operations early in 1996.

He pointed out, however, that the practical issue regarding North Korea's plan for nuclear development is how North Korea dealt with the nuclear fuel it extracted from the small five megawatt nuclear reactor which has been in operation since 1987.

#### **IAEA Chief Tells UN North Korea Refused Full Nuclear Inspection**

SK2503025494 Seoul YONHAP in English 0244 GMT  
25 Mar 94

[Text] United Nations, March 24 (YONHAP)—North Korea refused to let the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) fully check its seven declared nuclear sites during March 3-14 inspections, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix told the U.N. Security Council on Thursday.

In a press conference after his report to the Security Council, Blix said that North Korea is capable of producing plutonium needed to manufacture atomic bombs and that the Stalinist country may have more plutonium than it has admitted.

As North Korea refused to allow IAEA experts to examine a radiochemical laboratory, one of seven declared nuclear facilities, the IAEA cannot verify the laboratory has not produced plutonium since February 1993 when it was last inspected.

To determine whether the laboratory has produced plutonium, sampling and gamma-ray tests are necessary, he added.

Blix said he does not know whether North Korea has the capability to produce nuclear weapons, but the IAEA has concluded that Pyongyang diverted plutonium from spent nuclear fuel on several occasions as a result of its inspections. This means the North Koreans have secured far more plutonium than they admitted in the gram unit.

#### **DPRK Mission to Geneva Warns IAEA To Withdraw Resolution**

SK2503231094 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
2103 GMT 25 Mar 94

[YONHAP, REUTERS from Geneva]

[Text] North Korea warned that it will take a certain practical step if the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] does not withdraw its resolution regarding the nuclear inspection of North Korea. Today, the North Korean mission to Geneva distributed the statement issued by the North Korean General Department of Atomic Energy and denounced that the IAEA is pursuing a vicious political goal.

North Korea said that if the UN Security Council takes steps to impose sanctions on North Korea, it will regard these steps as a declaration of war and that it will take a practical step corresponding to the IAEA Secretariat's unfairness if the IAEA does not withdraw its resolution.

#### **PRC Asks ROK To Suspend Team Spirit, Patriot Deployment**

SK2803230294 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
2205 GMT 28 Mar 94

[AFP/YONHAP from Beijing]

[Text] China has expressed its support of North Korea's position on the nuclear issue by asking visiting ROK President Kim Yong-sam to suspend the ROK-U.S. Team Spirit joint military exercise and the deployment of Patriot missiles to the ROK.

(Zhen Guobang), a spokesman for the PRC Foreign Ministry, said this to reporters yesterday [28 March] after talks between President Kim Yong-sam and PRC President Jiang Zemin. He made it clear that China has no intention of pressuring North Korea on the nuclear issue, saying that China has made efforts in its own way, but the role it can play is restricted and that,

since North Korea is a sovereign country, no other country is in the position of telling or requiring it to do anything.

### **ROK Editorial Stresses PRC's Mediatorial Role on DPRK Issue**

*SK2103063694 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean  
21 Mar 94 p 3*

[Editorial: "China's Role and Responsibility"]

[Text] The East Asian countries and the rest of the world are focusing attention on China's role regarding the North Korea nuclear issue following the sudden aggravation of North-South relations with the rupture of the North-South working-level contact. Having signed a friendly and cooperative agreement, China is in a position to greatly influence North Korea.

It has been learned that while he was in Beijing, Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa met with Chinese state leaders, including PRC President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng, and asked them to persuade North Korea to fully accept international nuclear inspections.

Prior to the Japanese prime minister's Beijing visit, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Beijing last week and agreed with the Chinese side to jointly cooperate on resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Now, the countries concerned have formed an international cooperation system to check North Korean nuclear development.

As noted by Qiao Zonghuai, PRC Ambassador to the ROK, it is the Chinese official position to oppose the international community's strong steps against North Korea, including UN Security Council sanctions. We would like to stress a point, however, that the North Korean nuclear issue will have a serious impact not only on the Korean peninsula, but also on all East Asian countries, including countries surrounding the Korean peninsula. Japan—which shows the most sensitive reaction to the North Korean nuclear issue—has said on many occasions that it cannot but develop nuclear weapons if North Korea's nuclear development is not checked. Also, it is showing signs of strengthening its military capacity, such as by forming a regional security network, to deal with North Korea's development of long-range missiles. If the North Korean nuclear issue remains a factor of unrest in this area, regional economic cooperation—including Japanese-PRC economic cooperation, which is to be announced following Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa's visit in China, and ROK-PRC economic cooperation—will be seriously affected and this will adversely affect China's reform and opening policy that it is now actively carrying out.

We would like to stress the role and responsibility of China, which is one of the leading countries

throughout the world, rather than the regional economic cooperation in East Asia, including the support for China's openness. As a permanent member state of the UN Security Council, which is aimed at global peace, China should assume international responsibility for the North Korean nuclear issue. If the North Korean nuclear issue is referred to the UN Security Council and, as a result, the international community imposes sanctions on North Korea, China—which opposes international sanctions against North Korea—will be placed in a difficult situation. Therefore, it is better for China to persuade North Korea to meet the demands of the international community. This will also meet the demands of China for the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue through peaceful methods and dialogue.

China will not use "the North Korean nuclear issue card" multi-laterally to improve relations with foreign countries, we urge it to persuade North Korea to accept nuclear inspections. This is because we are concerned that the North Korean nuclear issue may cause constant unrest in peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, as well as East Asia, including China. To avoid such unrest, it is imperative for China to participate in the international cooperation system carried out by the ROK, the United States, and Japan and to carry out its responsibility and role as a great power in the international arena.

### **PRC Envoy Says China Will Not Agree to UN Sanctions on DPRK**

*SK1903052094 Seoul YONHAP in English 0511 GMT  
19 Mar 94*

[Text] Seoul, March 19 (YONHAP)—China will not agree to UN sanctions or any other stringent action against North Korea despite the current nuclear row, Chinese Ambassador to Seoul Zhang Tingyan said Saturday.

The envoy's comments come a week before South Korean President Kim Yong-sam goes to China, where seeking Beijing's support for any decision the international community makes, including sanctions, is a top priority.

Beijing supports North Korea-U.S. diplomatic normalization because it would enhance peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, just as China-South Korea relations did, he said.

"It's an international rule now to solve all issues through dialogue," Zhang said in an exclusive interview with YONHAP News Agency. "Why should the North Korean nuclear problem be an exception?"

Some countries are demanding hard-line action instead of dialogue, hurrying to take the matter to the UN Security Council and impose sanctions, he said.



"The security council, the sanctions or any other stringent measures, China cannot agree to," he told YONHAP.

"Such measures are not only ineffective, they would only complicate matters, aggravate the situation," Zhang said.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN nuclear watchdog, resumed inspections in North Korea early this month after a one-year break. But the agency announced this week that North Korea denied its inspectors access to critical sites, and thus they could not verify whether the stalinist state had diverted nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes.

Seoul and Washington's reaction was immediate and strong, with both saying they are becoming more convinced that dialogue may not be the right solution.

The 35-member IAEA Board of Governors convenes on March 21, and its final verdict on the inspection results will decide whether the matter goes to the security council.

"But one cannot say that the inspections were useless," the Chinese envoy said. "The fact that the IAEA inspectors went to North Korea was progress: Inspection itself was progress."

He strongly implied that this was the message President Jiang Zemin will deliver to South Korean President Kim Yong-sam, saying, "I don't know what President Jiang will say. But he is certain to make Beijing's position sufficiently clear."

Zhang emphasized dialogue among the parties directly involved, namely South and North Korea and Pyongyang and Washington.

He went further to state that Beijing wants to see Pyongyang and Washington normalize relations. "North Korea-U.S. diplomatic normalization will contribute to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. China-South Korea diplomatic normalization did," he said.

Zhang called President Kim's visit timely because Seoul and Beijing are at a juncture where they must discuss elevating their relations to a new level.

"People-to-people exchanges are important, but the most important thing is for heads of state to meet directly. In this sense, the summit opens at a most crucial time," he said.

He foresaw no chance of Chinese leader Jiang making simultaneous visits to Seoul and Pyongyang as was recently reported in the press.

As to Jiang's South Korean visit, he said the agenda will be settled at the summit with President Kim.

Beijing is ready to discuss regional and global political developments with Seoul and engage in multilateral

security dialogue within the framework of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the envoy said.

On bilateral military cooperation, Zhang said such links may well begin when Chinese military attaches arrive in Seoul sometime in mid-April.

### **Hosokawa Says Tokyo Discussing DPRK Issue With ROK, U.S.**

*OW2503023694 Tokyo KYODO in English 0226 GMT 25 Mar 94*

[Text] Tokyo, March 25 KYODO—Japan has been discussing North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons development program with South Korea and the United States to formulate its own policy on the issue, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa said Friday [25 March].

Chief Cabinet Secretary Masayoshi Takemura told a news conference that the premier told cabinet members he had compared notes on the nuclear threat from north Korea with visiting South Korean President Kim Yong-sam.

He also said Tokyo has been discussing the issue with Washington, the top government spokesman said.

But Hosokawa said it will take time before the government decides on its own policy to help resolve the North Korea issue.

Meanwhile, Takemura welcomed Russia's proposal to hold an international conference on Pyongyang's nuclear program, adding that Tokyo will seek further information about the proposal from Moscow.

Russia on Thursday proposed the holding of an international parley on the issue, saying it should be attended by Russia, China, the U.S., Japan, and North and South Korea, as well as representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations secretary general.

### **Reaction to Russian Proposal on DPRK Nuclear Issue**

#### **Ministry Seeks Multilateral Solution**

*LD2403154294 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1502 GMT 24 Mar 94*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Boris Krivoshey]

[Text] Moscow, 24 Mar—The situation surrounding the problem of the DPRK's participation in the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) is prompting growing anxiety and alarm. Acting on the basis of its firm, consistent adherence to the NPT and its determination to prevent a center of tension—especially nuclear—emerging on its borders, Russia is in favor of

a comprehensive settlement to the situation, says a Russian Foreign Ministry statement, with which Grigoriy Karasin, director of the Information and Press Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acquainted journalists at a briefing today.

Russia is prepared, the document observes, to support the resolution now under discussion in the UN Security Council appealing to the DPRK to meet its commitments to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] under the NPT.

Taking account of the fact that the talks have not been crowned with success, we regard as inadequate attempts to tackle the problem within a bilateral framework. We propose using a multilateral approach, which could be centered on an international conference attended by Russia, China, the United States, Japan, the DPRK, the ROK, and representatives of the UN secretary general and the IAEA director general, the Russian Foreign Ministry statement says.

We are certain, the Russian foreign policy department stresses, that only such an approach will enable us to find mutually acceptable, balanced solutions, which will ensure that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is strengthened and simultaneously prevent the situation from slipping into confrontation.

#### **ROK Says 'Thanks, But No Thanks'**

*SK2503031394 Seoul YONHAP in English 0305 GMT 25 Mar 94*

[Text] Seoul, March 25 (YONHAP)—South Korea opted to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue at the United Nations Friday, saying "thanks but no thanks" to a Russian proposal for an eight-party conference.

"Russia's proposal for an eight-party conference is part of the efforts to solve the North Korean nuclear problem through dialogue. We note the intentions behind it," a Foreign Ministry official said in a commentary.

"In solving the North Korean nuclear problem, efforts at the U.N. Security Council are important at this moment. The issue of an eight-party conference requires careful consideration by the United States, Japan and other involved nations," he said.

Russia's proposal invites participation by South and North Korea, the United States, Japan, China and Russia along with the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Seoul's reaction apparently reflects its reluctance to place Korean issues on the international table, although it seeks global coordination on the nuclear dispute. It has also chosen to rely on the South Korean-U.S. alliance at the moment instead of a multilateral arrangement.

Ministry officials said they were notified in advance of Moscow's proposal on Thursday afternoon.

Meanwhile, the officials welcomed Moscow's commitment to support the Security Council resolution on North Korea.

#### **IAEA Rejects Proposal**

*SK2603005194 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean 0005 GMT 26 Mar 94*

[Report by Cha Man-sun from Vienna]

[Text] The Russian Government's proposal for an eight-party conference to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue has been reportedly regarded as a strategy to strengthen its position in the international community. It is also possible that North Korea will use the proposal for propaganda purposes and to delay the settlement of the nuclear issue.

A relevant high-level official of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] pointed out that Russia should not overlook the fact that the UN Security Council is now discussing the North Korean nuclear issue, even though its proposal is an attempt to resolve the nuclear issue internationally and politically. In addition, he stressed that problems may arise in the positions of the UN Security Council and the IAEA, which have made efforts for nuclear nonproliferation throughout the world.

#### **Beijing To Study Proposal**

*HK2603090394 Hong Kong AFP in English 0345 GMT 26 March 94*

[Text] Beijing, March 26 (AFP)—China said Saturday [26 March] that it will study a Russian proposal for an international conference on the nuclear crisis in North Korea.

"We have taken note of Russia's proposal, and we will study it," a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said by telephone.

Moscow had proposed an international conference Thursday to try to find a solution to the nuclear impasse in North Korea. Pyongyang rejected a complete inspection of its suspect nuclear sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The conference would bring together the two Koreas, China, Japan, the United States and Russia and delegates from the United Nations and the IAEA. The countries concerned reacted rather coolly to the proposal on Friday.

China, one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, continues to oppose international sanctions against its communist ally, but Western diplomats at the United Nations said Friday that Beijing might sign a declaration on North Korea which would not include sanctions.

South Korean President Kim Young-Sam was expected to arrive in China Saturday for a five-day visit during which he will ask his hosts to help get North Korea to accept inspections of its nuclear installations and to reopen its dialogue with South Korea.

#### **Ukraine Soon No Longer Target of U.S. Missiles**

*LD2103190394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1811 GMT 21 Mar 94*

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Aleksey Agureyev, UKRINFORM correspondent Aleksey Petrunya]

[Text] Kiev March 21 TASS—Beginning May 30, 1994 Ukraine will no longer be a target for American strategic missiles, according to the agreements signed by the United States, Russia and Britain, ITAR-TASS and UKRINFORM learnt from well informed sources.

The sources said that this topic was discussed at the meeting between Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and visiting U.S. Secretary of Defence William Perry which was held behind the closed doors. The major leitmotif of the talks was the implementation of the U.S.-Russian-Ukrainian agreement signed in Moscow in January 1994, as well as the agreements reached during the recent U.S.-Ukrainian summit meeting in Washington. They call for Ukraine's "denuclearisation" and providing it with compensations and security guarantees.

The second most important issue is cooperation between Ukraine and the United States within the programmes of economic cooperation and defence conversion. The U.S. will provide financial assistance to Ukraine to finance the conversion of its defence industry and build housing for the demobilised military.

Kravchuk stressed that Ukraine is unswervingly observing its obligations under the three-party agreement—it has sent the second train full of nuclear warheads to Russia.

Perry stressed that relations between Ukraine and the United States are strategically important. He and Ukrainian Defence Minister Vitaliy Radetskyy who also attended the talks signed an agreement under which Ukraine will be granted 50 million dollars in addition to 135 million it is to receive under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The means will be used to finance the dismantlement of SS-24 missiles.

Radetskyy welcomed the U.S.-Russian-Ukrainian agreement as a "historic move and a way-out of the nuclear deadlock." "This step and the ratification by Ukraine of the START-I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol as a nuclear-free state virtually removes all juridical and other barriers for Ukraine's joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," he said.

At the same time, Radetskyy said that "the fulfillment of obligations assumed in nuclear disarmament is a costly process." He stressed the importance of U.S. assistance for carrying out disarmament and solving social problems facing the military.

"We have also reached full understanding on issues concerning the Partnership for Peace programme. We understand that Ukraine's future aims at full accession to European structures," Radetskyy said.

The sides also discussed cooperation in space exploration. The talks were attended by U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine William Miller.

#### **New Agreement on Supply of Russian Cryogenic Rockets to India**

*LD2503203794 Moscow Radio Rossii Network  
in Russian 1700 GMT 25 Mar 94*

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted: roundup of the week's space news] Talks ended in India on Tuesday [22 March] on matters relating to supplying Russian cryogenic rocket engines to India. According to the new agreement, Russia will deliver to India seven flying and two simulator booster units. The agreement on this was drawn up taking account of Russian legislation pertaining to export of rocket technology. The new document was signed in place of the 1991 agreement, which provided for supplying to India two booster units, transfer of technology for manufacturing them, and training of Indian specialists.

#### **France May Block Signing of Russo-EU Uranium Agreement**

*LD2203110294 Moscow RIA in English 0933 GMT  
22 Mar 94*

[Text] Brussels, March 22, RIA—According to a diplomatic source in the Eurocommission, the unexpected opposition of France at the bilateral consultations with Russia on the delivery of enriched uranium to the European market might block the signing of the agreement on Russo-EU partnership and cooperation.

Previously, the EU delegation demanded that the imports of unenriched uranium from Russia should be kept back, which hindered the talks. But at the last week's meeting in Paris the French delegation stated that the deliveries of Russian unenriched uranium were not the problem. Instead, France suggested, Russia's quotas for the delivery of enriched uranium should be halved.

A diplomat working with the Eurocommission said that if Russia accepted this proposal, this would create panic among the users of Russian uranium in Germany, Britain, Belgium and some other EU countries, which opted for priority development of nuclear engineering. The protectionist attitude of France put in question the signing of a multilateral agreement with the European Energy Charter, already signed by Russia, France and the EU.



### **UN Chemical Weapons Experts Leave Bahrain for Iraq**

*NC2003110394 Paris AFP in English 0947 GMT 20 Mar 94*

[Text] Manama, March 20 (AFP) - UN experts charged with eliminating President Saddam Husayn's chemical weapons program left Bahrain Sunday for a one-week inspection mission to Iraq, UN officials here said.

A five-member team led by American Gerald Brubaker was to take air samples from the former chemical weapons complex at al-Muthanna, west of the capital Baghdad, to search for the possible presence of chemical agents.

Iraq's chemical weapons were assembled at the site and most of them have since been destroyed.

A UN chemical weapons expert, Cees Wolterbreek of the Netherlands, said in December that he was "99 percent" certain that Iraq's chemical arsenal had been destroyed except for a few weapons and munitions.

The head of the UN Special Commission on disarming Iraq, Rolf Ekeus of Sweden, said on February 1 that he was still not completely satisfied with Iraq's answers about its chemical program.

The chemical team will be the first to visit Iraq since the UN Security Council decided Friday to continue sanctions against Baghdad which were imposed after the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

For the first time the council members could not agree on an assessment of Iraq's compliance with disarmament resolutions ending the 1991 Gulf war.

Russia, France, China and Brazil asked the council to recognize Iraqi "progress" toward disarmament but the United States and Britain rejected the request.

### **Czech Nuclear Engineering Exports to Ukraine Show Promise**

*AU2903140994 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 28 Mar 94 p 6*

[Vaclav Proks report: "Ukrainian Power Plants Need Skoda Nuclear Engineering Products"]

[Text] The representatives of the Skoda Jaderne strojirenstvi (Skoda Nuclear Engineering) company recently signed a contract to deliver to Ukraine the first major shipment worth more than 60 million korunas. The draft contract also deals with the security of the payment. The product concerned is compact containers for spent fuel pools at the Rivne nuclear power plant. According to the company director, Vaclav Lobovsky, Ukraine has expressed an interest in purchasing \$150 million worth of nuclear equipment from Skoda Jaderne strojirenstvi over the next five to eight years. Cooperation is subject to the complex solution to the problem of payments. According to Lobovsky, there is the possibility of barter—the trade for Ukrainian electricity or perhaps some other goods.

"Ukraine is trying to reduce its undesirable dependence on Russian monopoly suppliers, whose products allegedly are not of as high quality as ours. Cost advantages are losing attractiveness," Lobovsky claims.

Ukraine has the largest number of AVER 1000 [Water-Moderated Water-Cooled Power Reactor] reactors (10 in operation and four under construction). Only nuclear power plants are economically capable of producing electric power in Ukraine. Skoda Jaderne strojirenstvi introduced itself already in November by successfully completing a one-year test run at the Ukrainian power plant of its own modernized inching drive [krokovy pohon] for the reactor, in which even the Russians expressed interest.

Ukraine is now beginning to replace its outdated control and security systems. Ukrainian nuclear power plants are therefore most interested in Skoda's inching drives including the electronics, compact grids [kompaktni mrize], hermetic cable bushing, and also maintenance inspections, which Skoda allegedly offers at a price 10 times lower than Siemens, for instance. Ukraine is also deciding now from whom to purchase spent fuel containers. Skoda Jaderne strojirenstvi is not without chances. So far, it has been producing them under a German license, but as early as September it will introduce its own container prototype, which could become, according to Lobovsky, the most promising product of Skoda Plzen.

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